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Résumé
Cette thèse traite de l’acceptabilité de la politique environnementale en Su-
isse. La première partie de la thèse se focalise sur la demande pour la qualité
environnementale telle qu’exprimée par les urnes. L’analyse est menée à l’aide
de l’approche ’public choice’, qui est basée sur les hypothèses de rationalité
instrumentale et de maximisation de l’utilité. Pourtant, il est aussi conseillé
de prendre en compte les normes et préférences construites à l’intérieur d’une
société ainsi qu’une propension à penser au bien commun lorsqu’on étudie la
demande pour un bien public tel que l’environnement. C’est la raison pour
laquelle ces éléments ont été intégrés à l’analyse. De plus, à l’intérieur d’un
cadre analytique riche qui prend en compte les motivations des citoyens de
même que les facteurs contextuels pour expliquer le vote, il a été démontré
que les votants réagissent d’une manière significative à la perception de la sit-
uation économique que cela soit à leur propre échelle ou à celle de leur pays.
Par conséquent, lorsque ces votants sont assurés des bonnes dispositions de
l’économie nationale et de leur situation financière personnelle, la probabil-
ité qu’ils soutiennent une politique environnementale donnée est plus grande.
La deuxième partie de la thèse est consacrée aux préférences de différents
acteurs-clés en termes de politique environnementale ainsi qu’à la manière
dont ils forment des alliances durant la phase pré-parlementaire. En se basant
sur une analyse approfondie des réponses des acteurs-clés sur quatre proposi-
tions de loi, nous avons pu montrer que la ligne de conflit sur les politiques
environnementales en Suisse se base sur l’affrontement des visions d’une poli-
tique libérale et d’une politique interventionniste et que, donc, les possibil-
itées d’alliances transversales restent limitées. Malgré l’hypothèse formulée
par certains chercheurs d’un possible déplacement de cette ligne de conflit
dû à l’émergence d’attentes dites post-matérielles ou gauche-libertaires, nous
n’avons pas pu vérifier cette hypothèse pour la Suisse.
Mots-clés: Politique environnementale, démocratie directe, référendums, préférences,
vote économique, public choice, instruments de marché
vii
Abstract
The present thesis studies the acceptability of environmental policy in Switzer-
land. The first part of the thesis concentrates on citizens’ demand for envi-
ronmental quality at ballots. The analysis is guided by the public choice
framework, which is rooted in the assumptions of instrumental rationality
and utility-maximization. However, it is advisable to account for socially
constructed norms and preferences, and a logic of appropriateness, too when
studying the demand for a public good such as the environment. This is
why these elements were integrated into the analysis. Furthermore, in a rich
decision-making framework which controlled for citizens’ voting motivations
and for contextual factors influencing the vote, it was shown that voters react
sensitively to both their personal and the nation’s perceived economic condi-
tions. Thus, when they feel confident about the country’s or their personal
economic conditions, they are more likely to support environmental policy.
The second part of the thesis is devoted to actors’ policy preferences and their
alliance formation behavior in the pre-parliamentary phase. Based on an in-
depth analysis of actors’ responses to four pre-legislative drafts, it was shown
that the main conflict line in Swiss environmental policy runs along the mar-
ket vs. state divide and that, thus, the possibility to engage in cross-cutting
alliances remains limited. Despite hypotheses of scholars that this line of con-
flict may be shifting due to the emergence of post-material or left-libertarian
issues on political agendas, we were not able to corroborate this claim for
Switzerland.
Keywords: Environmental policy, direct democracy, referendums, stated pref-
erences, economic voting, public choice, market-based instruments
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‘Protection. For free traders, this word represents the con-
summate evil. For environmentalists, it is the ultimate good.’
Daniel C. Esty, 2001
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1 Introduction
On April 17, 2007 the United Nations Security Council held its first-ever de-
bate on the impact of climate change on peace and security. This meeting put
forth neither measurable consequences nor did it receive unanimous support
from all Security Council member states. However, it points to the growing
salience of environmental issues such as climate change. The origins of these
global climate protection activities date back to the 1992 ‘Earth Summit’ in
Rio de Janeiro, where developed countries pledged to stabilize Greenhouse
Gas (GHG) emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. The Kyoto Protocol in
1997 then went a step further demanding for a reduction of GHG emissions
by 5% below 1990 levels by 2008-12. These international developments had
repercussions on the national political scene as well. Inspired by international
efforts, Switzerland aimed at reducing its own CO2-emissions with a respec-
tive federal bill. In 1994, well before the Kyoto Protocol, Swiss government
proposed a first legislative draft which aimed at stabilizing CO2-emissions
akin to the Rio agreement. However, it took more than six years until the
CO2-law, heavily modified and subject to concessions by government, entered
into force on May 1, 2000.
Environmental and climate issues are rising to the top of political agendas
in advanced industrial democracies. Though, the growing importance of the
environmental issue has only rarely led to more stringent ecological policy or
greater acceptability in the political arena. Neither has it up to now led to a
big surge of Green parties’ vote shares. Yet, a new, ‘second era of environmen-
talism’ seems to be dawning which only partly resembles the grassroots ecolog-
ical movement of the late 1970s and early 1980s - the era where Green parties
emerged across Europe (Kitschelt 1989, Ladner 1989, Hug 1990). But this sec-
ond wave of environmentalism seems to point in a different direction: firstly,
the problem is global since climate change affects the entire planet regardless
of regional origins of emissions, and secondly, economic instruments are play-
ing an increasingly large role in mitigation and abatement efforts (Kolstad
& Toman 2005). There are reasons to believe that the concern for the envi-
ronment is indeed not only limited to developed countries but that emerging
markets such as the BRIC-economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China) will need
to take action against climate change, too, as their economies are growing at
a rapid pace and emitting ever-larger amounts of Greenhouse Gases. In the
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meantime, however, resistance to signing international emission abatement
treaties in these countries remains fierce.
The two aforementioned components then also distinguish the current phe-
nomenon from the one in the 1980s - the founding years of Green parties and
ecological movements such as the WWF and Greenpeace. Indeed, while green
parties were mostly created out of grassroots ecological movements and other
New Social Movements in advanced democracies, protection of natural re-
sources and the habitat is no longer an issue confined to a small set of actors
at the far political Left. The issue seems to have been picked up by social-
democratic, green and moderate bourgeois parties alike. Furthermore, the
state’s role in establishing environmental regulation dates back to the begin-
ning of the 20th century, where the goal of Swiss environmental regulation
was to protect mountain areas from earth slides and avalanches. In the 1950s,
under the influence of highly active pressure groups, which aimed at protect-
ing lakes and rivers against pollution, environmental regulatory activities were
undertaken. The ecological movement of the 1970s thus found its precursors
in the activities of the post-war environmental activists.1
However, there is a paradox to the current situation: while the prob-
lem nowadays figures prominently on political agendas and is used for po-
litical credit-claiming, enforcement of stringent environmental regulation re-
mains cumbersome (Schneider & Volkert 1999, Thalmann & Baranzini 2008).
As environmental policy entails redistributive politics and cost uncertainty
(McKibbin & Wilcoxen 2002), features which are closer to socialist than to
capitalist politics (Kitschelt 1994), bourgeois parties and organized business
traditionally oppose stringent environmental regulation as they fear economic
contraction. The latter thus seek to obtain regulation which maximizes short-
term benefits and minimizes costs for voters and interest groups, while left
and green parties and their natural allies strive for means to mitigate dam-
ages from pollution regardless of costs incurred (Kitschelt 1989, Scharpf 2000).
Therefore, scholars argue that the main conflict line in environmental policy
runs along a economy vs. ecology-axis (e.g. Jasper 1990, Esty 2001, Kriesi &
Jegen 2001). However, the distributive conflict is crucial not only for corporate
and collective actors (Scharpf 1997) but also for the people, the voters. It is
often argued that economic self-interest prevails when voters step into the bal-
1For a detailed account of the making of Swiss environmental politics, refer to Knoepfel,
Nahrath & Savary (2007) or Knoepfel (1992).
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lot booth and that ideological considerations only play a minor role (Deacon
& Shapiro 1975, Kahn 2002, Kahn & Matsusaka 1997). However, our analyses
show that self-interest may explain a big part of the vote outcomes but that
it is important to account for social bases of preferences and norms too when
analyzing voting decisions on a public good such as the environment.
Voting on the environment has for a long time been omitted from scholarly
attention. Firstly, there was only little possibility to study voters’ stated
preferences on the environment due to the absence of a great amount of direct
democratic mechanisms in advanced democracies at the nation-state level.
Secondly, and possibly more important, academic interest was for a long time
limited to analyses of voting behavior in national general elections where data
was also easier to come by. Lastly, scholarly focus was directed towards the
emergence and formation of Green parties in Europe while voters’ preferences
on the environment at national ballots remained little explored (Kitschelt
1989, Poguntke 1989, Hug 1990, Sciarini & Finger 1991).
In the economics profession, however, research was directed mainly at ex-
ternality control and at means to mitigate harmful effects of pollution (Butler
& Maher 1986). The seminal paper on pollution control by Buchanan & Tul-
lock (1975) directed scholarly attention away from direct regulation towards
incentive taxes. They argued that the efficacy of taxes over direct regula-
tion is greater and that enforcement of results is facilitated (Buchanan &
Tullock 1975). Their public choice approach to externality control thus pled
for a new direction in emissions control. However, enforcement and implemen-
tation of economic instruments such as tradable permits and emission taxes
remain difficult in real-world politics despite economists’ and policy analysts’
recommendations (e.g. OECD 2001, Thalmann & Baranzini 2008, Schneider
& Volkert 1999). Hahn (1989) showed that, despite recommendations by en-
vironmental economists to rely increasingly on market-based instruments in-
stead of direct regulation, command-and-control approaches prevailed at the
end of the 1980s. Kirchgässner & Schneider (2003) maintain that the appli-
cation of economic instruments such as incentive taxes is still scarce but that
acceptability has risen slightly. In Switzerland, however, the use of market-
based instruments is still met with considerable resistance by employers and
the politico-economic milieux. Wallart & Bürgenmeier (1996) showed that
in a survey, more than half of major companies regarded incentive taxes as
the most efficient instrument but as we will see later, their resistance to im-
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plementation has been very efficacious. Market-based instruments have the
advantage that they can be enforced budget-neutrally and should not incur
redistributive politics. Yet, a paradox remains: although incentive taxes are
economic instruments relying on market mechanisms, they call upon interven-
tionist politics, too.2 Indeed, the design of the revenue recycling is crucial since
partial or full earmarking will lead to intersectoral redistribution or to subsi-
dizing of lower income classes. Thus, in order to secure liberal market forces’
support of incentive taxes, full redistribution of revenues is essential (Deacon
& Shapiro 1975, Felder & Schleiniger 2002, Thalmann & Baranzini 2008).
To date, only few studies exist which analyze citizens’ stated preferences
on the environment at ballots. Early on voting analyses with survey and ag-
gregate data were undertaken at the sub-national level in the United States by
Deacon & Shapiro (1975) and Fischel (1979). The study by Deacon & Shapiro
(1975) focused on citizens’ preferences for a public good, here the preservation
of the California Coastline, using aggregate municipal-level data. They pro-
posed a public choice model where the individual is expected to pursue highest
attainable utility subject to a budget constraint (cf. Downs 1957). Integrating
a certain number of socioeconomic characteristics, they find higher educa-
tion to be highly consistent with a favorable stance towards environmental
protection. Furthermore, having relatively conservative views seems to under-
mine approval, whereas their results on income remain elusive. Fischel (1979)
corroborated these results in the late 1970s claiming that pro-environment
voting choices might be divided along economic and social class lines. Deacon
& Shapiro (1975, p. 954) concluded, that ‘ ... the results obtained cast doubt
upon the notion that individuals somehow alter their preferences (or behavior)
away from selfishness and towards the social good as they leave the market
and enter the polling booth. To the extent that the impact of the proposed
policy changes could be specified beforehand, observed voting responses were
consistent with self-interest’. Thus, research in ecological economics assumes
that the demand for environmental quality can to a great extent be explained
by rational, self-interested behavior; thus, by price and income effects only
(Kahn & Matsusaka 1997, Kahn 2002). In a similar vein, Schneider & Volk-
ert (1999) argue that voters’ self-interest in favor of environmental policy is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for successfully ecologizing the economy.
They indicate that voters must be aware of long-term ecological problems and
2I owe this thought to Philippe Thalmann.
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must not make a trade-off between job security and environmental protection
in order to approve of environmental policy at ballots.
Hence, as outlined above, voting on the environment has to date still
received fairly little scholarly attention. I try to fill this gap with my contri-
butions in Chapters 2 and 3. Moreover, Chapter 4 takes on a different focus
to the study of policymaking, in that it analyzes the pre-parliamentary phase,
thus, the stage in policymaking where influence of corporate and collective
actors is believed to be biggest. As has been shown in the above and will
be explored further below, the present thesis thus sheds light on two major
research questions: on the one hand I strive to comprehend better voters’
motivations and choice when voting on the environment, and on the other
hand, I seek to shed light on corporate and collective actors’ policy prefer-
ences. More exactly, the first question is concerned with voters’ self-interest,
socially constructed preferences, and the influence of economic conditions on
the vote choice, whereas the second question deals with pressure group poli-
tics and alliance behavior during the consultation procedure. These research
questions will be outlined in more detail in the actual Chapters and I wil
give some indications as to the literature and the empirical methods used to
address these questions.
Plan of the Thesis
In the remaining part of this introduction, I will present the three Chapters
of the thesis. Each Chapter was written in the context of the research project
which was at the origin of the thesis.3 All three papers are have been accepted
for publication pending revision in international scientific journals.
In Chapter 2, written together with Bruno Lanz, we propose to expand
the common notion of voters, guided by self-interest and utilitarianism, with a
framework which allows for price and income effects but also takes into account
the role of ideology and norms-based behavior. We analyze three referendums
in the year 2000 on incentive taxes on fossil energy and the promotion of re-
newable energy sources. All three projects - two were backed by government
and parliament - were dismissed by the Swiss electorate. We study this triple
refutal with municipal-level aggregate data conducting a WLS Seemingly Un-
related Regression Estimation (SURE). Our criticism is mainly directed at
3Ph. Thalmann & P. Sciarini. 2004. ‘A Multilevel Analysis of Votes on Environmental
Issues’. Swiss National Science Foundation, grant no. 100012-103517.
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an overly simplistic conception of man, which assumes utility-maximization
and self-interest to be the sole motivation when making a decision on a public
good such as the environment. We contend that the ‘ideological’ or ‘collective
choice’ component must be included when analyzing voting outcomes. We
do not intend to dismiss the public choice framework, on the contrary, but
we aim to propagate a broader conception of preferences, based inter alia on
socially accepted norms and rules.
Sagoff (1998, p. 214) refers to the dualism between self-interested and
norms-based behavior as the ‘utilitarian and deontological ... conceptions of
rational choice’. Thus, while the former relies on a strict weighing of costs and
benefits, the latter may adopt behavior which matches a certain situation or
norms. Judgment is then mostly based on a logic of appropriateness, i.e. on
a logic where specific behavior benefits society as a whole. Consequently, the
individual choice is deemed to be consistent with social roles of identities, rules,
and institutions shaping human behavior (March & Olsen 1998). Likewise,
this is also referred to as sociological institutionalism where institutions are
defined so as to include rules, routines and standard operating procedures
as well as socially constructed worldviews (Scharpf 2000). Remark though
that Diekmann & Preisendörfer (1992, 2003) claim that the pro-environmental
behavior might be foregone when the costs incurred by the environmental
measures appear too high and that thus environmental policies would only be
enacted in so called low-cost situations.
Yet, while economists assume people to follow their self-interest and to
make a rational choice, early research in Political Science on Americans’ vot-
ing behavior in national elections was rather pessimistic. Scholars did not
regard the citizens as being able to make a reasoned choice based on po-
litical convictions or ideology. The conclusion drawn by these scholars was
that citizens were unable to reason and deliberate about politics in a sophisti-
cated manner and did not dispose of constrained belief systems, i.e. ideology
(Converse 1964). In the decades which followed after the minimalist view
portrayed in the famous Michigan study The American Voter by Campbell et
al. (1960), the discussions surrounding the voter’s aptitude to reach a polit-
ical statement did not lose any of their intensity. While voters are believed
to remain little informed about politics or to have no attitudes whatsoever
(Zaller 1992, Popkin 1991), ways out of this dilemma have been sketched out.
Indeed, it is now widely accepted that citizens, albeit not being close to the
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democratic ideal-type, can overcome the obstacles of low political informed-
ness to make a strategic decision by mimicking the behavior of like-minded
citizens and employing heuristic cues (Lupia 1994). Scholars emphasize the
cognitive deliberations voters put themselves through to reach an attitudinal
statement in referendum or national elections when low political sophistica-
tion constrains the process of opinion formation. This view intended to show
that people do reason their choices some way or the other, even though their
levels of political expertise are rather low and they lack coherent ideology
(Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock 1991). Especially in Switzerland several studies
provide evidence for this new outlook in public opinion research (e.g. Christin,
Hug & Sciarini 2002, Kriesi 2005, Sciarini & Marquis 2000).
Following this strand of research a study was done in the larger context of
the present thesis, which aimed to test John Zaller’s (1992) Receive-Accept-
Sample model applied to environmental referendums in Switzerland (Sciarini,
Bornstein & Lanz 2007). His model is essentially concerned with the average
voter who, making an opinion statement, gives an answer according to what
is ‘at the top of his head’ at any given moment. Hence, when individuals
form political opinions, they do not have an attitude which they refer to but
rather make an opinion statement on the grounds of the information they re-
ceive from the political elites and on their level of political awareness which
interacts closely with their political predispositions. Based on a theoretical
framework which took into account utilitarian, normative and cognitive de-
terminants of vote choice, the analysis was able to show that each group of
determinants has an impact on the choice and that none of the three proves su-
perior in explaining the outcome. Regarding the predictors of the vote choice,
it was shown that the left-right divide proved to be remarkably stable even in
the light of intervening variables, and that the influence of citizens’ political
awareness and of the elites is indeed crucial for the choice (for more detailed
results see Sciarini, Bornstein & Lanz [2007]).
Building on the public choice approach, we tested how the economy vs.
ecology divide impacts on people’s vote choice. We followed on the one hand,
the rational choice-influenced economic voting literature, and on the other
hand, we took into account concepts from research in political psychology.
Thus, in Chapter 3, written together with Philippe Thalmann, we investigate
how perceptions of economic conditions in Switzerland influence individuals’
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voting decisions. To this end, we tested the relationship between perceptions
of personal and national economic predicaments with the readiness to pay for
the protection of natural resources and the habitat. Thus, if the economy vs.
ecology polarization holds true, we should be able to observe that citizens are
less willing to pay for the environment when their pocketbooks, or those of
the country are empty - or when they perceive them to be empty.
The concept of economic voting was developed and applied first in the
context of U.S. national elections (Kramer 1971). The main hypothesis is as
simple as it sounds: if the performance of the incumbent party is satisfactory
in terms of economic performance such as per capita income, then citizens
will vote in order to retain the party in office (ibid., p. 134). Building on his
analysis, a wealth of research followed which evolved and refined the original
claim, introducing e.g. the distinction between retrospective and prospec-
tive economic voting (Kinder & Kiewiet 1981). Furthermore, it was argued
that voters may not only care about macro-economic conditions (sociotropic
voters), but about their personal financial situation too (pocketbook voters)
(MacKuen, Erikson & Stimson 1992, Sanders 1991, Markus 1988). Likewise,
in ecological economics it has been emphasized that a good economic perfor-
mance of a country is crucial to gain voters’ approval on environmental policy
(Schneider & Volkert 1999, Kirchgässner & Schneider 2003).
Using the survey answers from the post-referendum VOX-surveys to the
open question on citizens’ vote motivation on a number of environmental bal-
lots, we were able to classify the electorate into five groups of voters, that is (1)
people making a decision with the help of heuristic cues (Lupia 1994, Snider-
man, Brody & Tetlock 1991); (2) those making a vote choice based on partisan
preferences or following the advice of government (Downs 1957, Kriesi 2005);
(3) citizens thinking about their personal financial situation when casting their
vote; (4) citizens taking a decision based on the nation’s current economic sit-
uation; (5) and finally those anticipating future economic developments of
the nation’s welfare (see e.g. Kinder & Kiewiet 1981, Sanders 1991, Bowler
& Donovan 1998, Kinder, Adams & Gronke 1989). The latter three groups
are assumed to carefully weigh costs against benefits when making a decision
and thus, to rebuke green policies in times of economic downturn. We ana-
lyzed 36 environmental referendums in Switzerland, which took place between
1983 and 2004, with a logistic multilevel model controlling for individual-level
as well as economic and other contextual determinants of the vote choice.
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Furthermore, we set up precise hypotheses pertaining to each group’s voting
behavior. We used multilevel models to be able to model individual-level and
aggregate data simultaneously. The approach accounts for variance in the
dependent variable measured at the lowest level of analysis while incorporat-
ing information from the other levels of analysis. Furthermore, the context
level can be defined spatially or in any other environment which is believed
to interact with individual factors shaping political behavior (Steenbergen &
Jones 2002, p. 219).
Citizens’ negative perceptions of the nation’s economic condition thus have
an adverse effect on approval of green policy. Moreover, when citizens perceive
to be financially better-off, their approval rates are more likely to take a hike.
However, this does not apply to all voter groups. Although variables pertain-
ing to public opinion processes and elite influence as well as to the impact of
political awareness on the decision could not be tested within our framework,
we underline the close relationship between citizens’ vote choice on the envi-
ronment and their perception of personal and national economic predicaments.
Finally, Chapter 4 analyzes environmental bills at one of the earliest stages
in policymaking. The focus of the article lies on actors’ policy preferences in
the pre-parliamentary phase, i.e. in the consultation procedure. I analyze four
pre-legislative drafts between 1990 and 2004, which all aim at introducing in-
centive taxes in environmental regulation. Kitschelt (1994) argued that the
environmental policy space is no longer divided solely by a market-state axis,
but that a second authoritarian-libertarian axis cuts across the first shifting
political competition towards a left-libertarian vs. right-authoritarian config-
uration. His work is based on Inglehart’s (1977) post-materialism hypothesis
showing that differences in lifestyles and the emphasis on non-material goods
were largely due to economic prosperity after WWII and the sustained absence
of war (Inglehart 1977, pp. 13). This in turn led to a growing importance of
issues such as the conservation and protection of the environment. Following
Kitschelt (1994), these changing value orientations were mainly due to four
developments: rising levels of aﬄuence, higher education, a shift towards more
white-collar occupations, and the growth of the modern welfare state (ibid., p.
21). Electoral competition would therefore no longer be based on class politics,
but on a new left-libertarian vs. right-authoritarian conflict. Whereas I do not
specifically test his hypothesis of the re-configuration of electoral competition,
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I aim at uncovering the alliances which were formed between corporate and
collective actors during consultation. I argue that, if the above statements
hold true, we should be witnessing cross-cutting alliances as left-libertarian
issues are believed not only to shift electoral competition but also to have the
capacity to cut across the distributive axis (Carter 2006, Kitschelt 1988).
The data stems from actors’ responses to the policy drafts during consul-
tation procedure and is analyzed with Multidimensional Scaling. The consul-
tation procedure is deemed crucial in that actors can influence the bill to be
adopted more fundamentally by voicing their opinion earlier in the policymak-
ing process (Sciarini 2006, Papadopoulos 2001). In corporatist Switzerland
interest associations have a strong influence on policymaking. Furthermore,
members of parliament are bound by double loyalties: on the one hand they
represent their party’s interests, on the other hand they are often tied to
sectoral employers and employees organizations, or to other consumer and
environmental groups (Kriesi 2001, Linder 2006). Indeed, my analysis corrob-
orates not only the economy-ecology antagonism, but also the difficulties of
enforcing environmental policy against a strong alliance of organized business,
bourgeois parties and employers organizations. Hence, my analysis reverber-
ates George Stigler’s (1971, p. 3) famous words, that ‘regulation is acquired
by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit’. This
thesis shall therefore also shed light on the difficulty of enforcing stringent and
effective climate and environmental policy in Switzerland in the light of active
pressure group politics inside and outside the parliamentary realm.
In the above I made clear, that the issues raised in my thesis are highly
related to one another although each Chapter adopts a different approach and
different methods to the study of policymaking. The underlying assumption is
that the acceptability of environmental policy at ballots, and the enforceability
in the parliamentary arena is complicated by a distributive conflict. Hence,
environmental policy is, more than other policy domains, subject to a trade-
off between interventionist politics and liberal market economics advocating
the primacy of economic growth and security.
Furthermore, the objects studied in the three Chapters are interdependent.
In the second Chapter, we analyze three projects at ballots with aggregate
municipal-level data so as to control for the effects uncovered by Thalmann
(2004), who studies the same objects with post-referendum survey data. This
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extension of his analysis thus proved insightful as we were able to take into
account determinants unavailable to individual-level analyses. But secondly,
these three ballots also have a direct link with the objects studied in Chapter
4. Not only were both to introduce incentive taxes on energy and pollutants,
but many business actors and employers rejected the three bills at ballots in
the year 2000 on the grounds that the federal law on CO2 entered into force
the same year. Thus, this is crucial to note, since the analysis in Chapter
4 essentially helps us to understand that business support to the projects
was declined in 2000 on the grounds of bad timing and, equally important,
on the constraining design of the bills: only one of the three bills foresaw
complete redistribution of revenues to the population and the firms. As I
was able to show in Chapter 4 the question of revenue-use seems to be the
most important one to business and economy actors. Thus, the objects for the
second Chapter were chosen so as to re-analyze Thalmann’s (2004) study with
more and refined determinants and aggregate data, whereas case selection in
the fourth Chapter was made so as to observe behavior of corporate actors on
similar projects as well as to be able to analyze alliance formation behavior in
Swiss environmental politics.4
Moreover, while these two Chapters aim at the understanding of the ac-
ceptability of incentive taxes on energy, case selection in the third Chapter
followed a somewhat different path. Parting from the research project funded
by the Swiss National Science Foundation, it was envisaged to analyze all votes
held in Switzerland on the environment since the 1980s. This was done in two
distinct steps: while the paper by Sciarini, Bornstein & Lanz (2007) stud-
ied a subset of these votes up to 1990, the paper by Bornstein & Thalmann
(2007), that is Chapter 4, analyzed all votes on the environment where post-
referendum survey data was available. Thus, also the three projects of 2000
which were analyzed beforehand (Bornstein & Lanz 2007, Thalmann 2004).
This comprehensive test of voting determinants on environmental referendums
was thus an important feature of the publicly funded research project and the
present thesis.
Without further ado, the next three Chapters present the three distinct
papers, while I conclude with a short synthesis, an outlook on further research
and some implications to environmental policymaking.
4Unfortunately, an envisaged extension of the analysis in Chapter 4 into the 1970s was
not possible due to the unavailability of data.

2 Voting on the Environment: Price or Ideology?
Evidence from Swiss Referendums
This chapter is a slightly modified version of a paper written together with
Bruno Lanz (Bornstein & Lanz 2007), which was accepted for publication
pending revision at Ecological Economics.
Abstract
Studies on preferences for environmental quality usually posit that price
and income explain most of the observed choices. However, we argue
that conceptions of social norms and the common good are equally im-
portant when analyzing environmental voting outcomes and are a sig-
nificant component of the environmental demand. We study aggregate
results of three ballot proposals in Switzerland put to vote in the year
2000 which foresaw different tax schemes on fossil energy. All three bills
were rejected by the electorate. We are able to show that regions with
producer interests, car commuting habits and elderly population are less
supportive of ecological tax reforms, unlike higher education and leftist
political affinity that work in favor of the bills. More importantly, our
results underline the importance of including variables pertaining to the
notion of ideology, both in terms of statistical fit and obtaining unbiased
estimates for price and income determinants.
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2.1 Introduction
Economists’ analyses of environmental demand usually posit that price and
income effects explain most of the variance and that the environment can
be analyzed as any other good (Kahn 2002, Kahn & Matsusaka 1997). The
traditional utilitarian view explains individual decision-making as a weighing
of costs against expected benefits for a specific policy. This calculus is seen as
guiding the median voter’s choice in order for her to receive highest attainable
utility (Deacon & Shapiro 1975, Downs 1957). Hence, when analyzing voting
outcomes on three energy-taxation bills in Switzerland (see below), we find
that at the aggregate level the choice pattern among different regions is to
be explained by the structural attributes that make costs and benefits of the
projects vary. According to this approach the acceptance for the projects, and
in turn the demand for the environmental good, is influenced by the price that
each individual has to pay.
Scholars from other disciplines argue, though, that citizens might also
follow a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March & Olsen 1998) to make a choice
consistent with roles of identities, rules, and institutions which shape human
behavior. They therefore propagate a view in which individuals engage in
social processes in order to arrive at a common judgment on the value of an
environmental good (Sagoff 1998).
Furthermore, the advent of the New Left and their subsequent internal-
ization of left-libertarian values, such as the ecology agenda during the 1980s,
demonstrates the importance of a vision of society where non-market values
receive equal importance (Kitschelt 1989). Hence, we argue that income and
price effects explain considerable amounts of the environmental demand func-
tion but that the ‘ideological’ or ‘collective choice’ component of the common
good environment is equally important.
Direct democracy in Switzerland provides for a setting which allows us ob-
serving directly binding choices towards the provision of environmental goods.
We analyze the acceptability of three different taxes on fossil energy put to vote
in September 2000 with municipal-level aggregate data. The price increase for
this type of energy source would have entailed financial repercussions on house-
holds as well as distributional effects. While two of the three projects were to
subsidize renewable energy sources and thus to promote ‘green energy’, the
third bill foresaw revenue recycling via social security contributions. Hence,
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this third proposal can be viewed as a reform of the work-related fiscal system.
However, all three bills were rejected by Swiss voter.1
We contend that the demand for ‘green energy’ can be understood as a
demand for environmental quality which we are able to observe through voting
outcomes. In this setting, how do price and income effects fare compared to
norms-based and ideological aspects? Or in other words, how can we compare
voters’ instrumental rationality with an approach which emphasizes the role
of social norms (Elster 1989)?
Economists tend to assume that voters do not change preferences and
behavior away from selfishness when voting on environmental issues (Deacon
& Shapiro 1975). We claim that this is not necessarily the case since there is
a strong ‘public good’ component inherent to environmental regulation which
can complement individuals’ cost-benefit analysis (Sagoff 1998, Vatn 2005,
Hammar & Jagers 2007). In turn, the willingness of respondents to contribute
to the public good may bear an important part in the observed choices.
While a better understanding of the demand for environmental goods is
the primary objective of this study, a second aspect is to highlight acceptabil-
ity of climate policy. Indeed, science acknowledges that anthropogenic climate
change has become one of the most salient environmental issues in the past
decades (Kolstad & Toman 2005, IPCC 2007) and that a mix of instruments,
such as emissions taxes, voluntary approaches and tradable permits is suited
best to deal with conflicting goals of efficiency and equity (Baranzini, Thal-
mann & Gonseth 2004). Thus, by studying voting outcomes on the three
energy bills we contribute to the growing but still scarce literature on refer-
endums on environmental policy.
Following the introduction, we will explain the three ballot proposals in
Section 2.2. Thereafter, we present the theoretical framework and provide for
measures of price and income effects in Section 2.3, and ideology effects in
Section 2.4. Section 2.5 is concerned with the econometric specification of our
analysis and we discuss the estimation results in Section 2.6. The last Section
concludes.
1Thalmann (2004) analyzed the same bills with individual-level data and with a reduced
model.
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2.2 The three tax proposals
During the second half of the 1990s environmental interest groups and organi-
zations gathered enough signatures for two popular initiatives to be submitted
to the Swiss population.2 The two popular initiatives, the ‘solar initiative’ and
the ‘energy-environment initiative’, both aimed at taxing fossil energy and pro-
moting renewable energy. After parliament had drafted two more modest and
balanced counterproposals, the second of the two initiatives was withdrawn
by its organizers leaving the total number of bills to be voted on at three. The
following information stems from the official ‘Voting Brochure’ distributed to
the population before every referendum.
During the political campaign, the so called ‘Initiative Committee FEU-
SOL’ emphasized particularly three issues of the bills citizens should take into
account when making their choice: the responsibility for the generations to
come, global warming and the increased possibility of natural catastrophes,
as well as health related problems from bad air quality such as asthma and
bronchitis. They argued that a reduced use of energy and therefore a better
environmental quality could be achieved at the cost of small personal sacrifices;
this in turn would allow to leave a healthier environment to our children.
The first of the three proposals, named solar initiative, would have levied
a tax during twenty-five years on fossil and nuclear energy, starting at Swiss
Francs (CHF) 0.001/kWh and increasing to 0.005/kWh (1 CHF ≈ 0.82 US$).
The estimated revenues of CHF 750m per year would have been equally dis-
tributed for the promotion of solar energy and for energy conservation. The
law would have become effective at the latest three years after acceptance
of the initiative. Parliament and government rejected the initiative on the
grounds that it favored solar energy disproportionately and neglected the pro-
motion and further empowerment of hydrological power; they presented a
counterproposal, the so called energy conservation package.
The counterproposal, the energy conservation package envisaged a tax of
CHF 0.003/kWh during ten to fifteen years on non-renewable energy, starting
in 2001. Revenues were to be used for four purposes where they would have
2The Swiss political system allows anyone to require a referendum on a bill passed
in parliamentary, provided one manages to gather 50,000 signatures within 100 days from
citizens who have the right to vote. In order to launch a popular initiative, i.e. an amendment
to federal law or the constitution, 100,000 signatures must be collected within 18 months.
If the required number of signatures are obtained, Parliament and Government may then
issue a voting recommendation and/or a counterproposal to the bill.
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been split equally for the promotion of renewable energy, for energy conserva-
tion, for maintenance works on hydroelectric plants, and for energy-efficiency
programs. The counterproposal was prepared by the Committee for the En-
vironment, Spatial Planning and Energy (CESPE) of the Council of States,
i.e. the higher chamber of parliament, and received majority support by both
chambers in parliament and by the Federal Council (Government).
The third project put to vote, the so called green tax reform, was the coun-
terproposal designed by the CESPE to the energy-environment-initiative. As
mentioned above, this second initiative was withdrawn by its organizers after
deliberation in parliament showed overwhelming support for this counterpro-
posal. Of the three proposals it would have provided for the highest tax, grad-
ually increasing to a maximum of CHF 0.02/kWh on non-renewable energy.
Revenues p.a. were expected to be around CHF 3 billion which would have
been used to lower social security contributions for employers and employees
(up to 0.65 percentage points). The tax would have entered into force at the
earliest in 2004 and in incremental steps, but did not foresee any temporal
limitation.
The Federal Council claimed that both the energy conservation package
and the green tax reform would have provided for a 10% decrease in CO2
emissions. This point is important to note since many business representatives
claimed that the three bills became obsolete since the Swiss CO2-law had
entered into force only a few months earlier and pursued the same goals.3 Most
importantly, all three proposals provided for full or partial exemption from the
taxes for industries heavily dependent on non-renewable energy. Furthermore,
the bills foresaw that parliament would be able to fix lower tax levels for energy
sources already heavily touched by other taxes, such as gasoline or diesel.
No accumulation of taxes was possible: a subsidiary question asked citi-
zens to indicate which of the two bills, the solar initiative or its parliamentary
counterproposal, the energy conservation package they preferred if both were
to be accepted. Had the green tax reform been accepted in addition to the
other two, then it would have been the only one to become effective. How-
ever, this mechanism was not used since all three proposals were rejected by
the population. Indeed, the solar initiative was rejected strongly with only
3Around 1994 the Swiss government began first hearings and the official consultation
procedure on the so called CO2-law. It entered into force on May 1, 2000 and aims to reduce
CO2-emissions by 10% by 2010 compared to 1990 (see Chapter 4).
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31.3% of yes-votes whereas the counterproposal received 45.3% of yes-votes.4
Finally, the approval rate for the green tax reform was at 44.5%. Figure 2.1
shows the voting results. The surfaces of the communes have been adapted to
their populations. In this way, the visual representation of proportions of ex-
pressed votes is not distorted by the communes’ surfaces (a similar cartogram
of Switzerland was used by Schuler et al. [2007]).
For the sake of completeness it must be noted that the participation rate of
the vote was relatively high at 44.8%. This might to a great extent be due to
the presence of yet another initiative, which demanded for a cap of the foreign
population in Switzerland to be set at 18%. The ‘18-percent-initiative’ was
not only able to mobilize a big portion of voters but also gathered most of the
media’s attention. It is therefore impossible to disentangle the participation
effects for the other votes on the same day from participation rates concerning
our objects of interest.
2.3 Measuring income and price effects
As the sections above make clear, Swiss nationals were asked to state their
preferences towards a project that would have modified the relative prices of
the different energy sources and raised the overall cost of energy. The proposed
bills would have reduced the adverse environmental impact of Switzerland’s
fossil energy consumption by increasing the price of non-renewable energy in
favor of other sources of energy. In this context, the environmental good to
be decided upon would have been created by the potential reduction of fossil
energy consumption and the change towards more environmentally friendly
energy sources.
Since we cannot observe the regional price associated with the environ-
mental benefits, we need to proxy for the cost-benefit analysis undertaken in-
dividually among the population. To this end, an essential component of the
environmental demand is the regional income level; we use the average gross
income per tax-payer in thousands of Swiss Francs (CHF). Non-linearities for
this parameter are also introduced by adding higher order terms, in line with
previous studies (Kahn 2002).
4Although both bills were rejected there was an overwhelming support in the subsidiary
question for the energy conservation package over the solar initiative with a ratio of nearly
2 to 1.
2.3. Measuring income and price eﬀects 19
Percentage of
yes-votes
0.01000 - 0.10000
0.10001 - 0.20000
0.20001 - 0.30000
0.30001 - 0.40000
0.40001 - 0.50000
0.50001 - 0.60000
0.60001 - 0.70000
0.70001 - 0.80000
0.80001 - 0.90000
0.90001 - 1.00000
Green Tax
Energy Conservation
Package
Solar Initiative
Data Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office, Census 2000
Map: André Ourednik
Figure 2.1: Voting outcomes for the three projects under scrutiny
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Table 2.1: Simulated output change due to the three taxes on sector-specific
production in Switzerland in 2010
Solar Init. Energy Cons. Green Tax
Fossil energy -1.07% -1.75% -6.92%
Electricity -0.01% -0.02% -0.09%
Paper production -0.03% -0.05% -0.20%
Chemicals -0.04% -0.06% -0.23%
Mining industry -0.08% -0.12% -0.47%
Transport -0.17% -0.28% -1.18%
Total -0.03% -0.04% -0.17%
In addition to income, resistance to environmental policy is generally
shown to be higher in regions with a larger share of producer interests since
enforcement could lead to lower profits, wages and employment (Schneider &
Volkert 1999). In order to have a clearer picture of the three proposals, we
simulated the respective impacts of the energy taxes on the Swiss economy.
This is particularly important since the taxes would have had a differentiated
impact on the economic sectors and would have modified the current inter-
national competitivity for the Swiss economy. Therefore, voters working or
living in regions whose activity depends on vulnerable industrial sectors may
have triggered higher refusal rates because of the probability of increased eco-
nomic costs. Table 2.1 displays the results of simulations undertaken with a
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model developed by Bernard, Vielle
& Viguier (2005).
Figures reported in the table are percentage variations in economic pro-
duction by sectors relative to the ‘business as usual’ scenario, estimated for
the year 2010. We applied a uniform tax rate for all sectors although the
proposals would have exempted the energy-intensive industries partially or
completely. Note that we are interested in the relative impact on the different
sectors of economic activity rather than with absolute impacts on production.
Thus, the CGE calculations will enable us to compare the sectoral employment
compositions with the respective voting outcomes.
Table 2.1 is a scenario where one of the three proposals has been accepted
and implemented without any other constraints in any other country. Put dif-
ferently, no country would introduce emission reduction policies such as taxes
or tradable permits apart from Switzerland. Thus, the loss in Switzerland is
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essentially due to international competition effects as other countries continue
to produce without constraints.
In order to measure these effects, we include a measure of the distribution
of the active population in the industrial sectors whose output were the most
sensitive in the CGE simulations. The data refers to 1998 and is adjusted for
commuters to reflect the employment of each commune’s inhabitants rather
than the communal production (see Anson & Cadot 2004). Despite the ex-
emption accorded to these industries, workers in these sectors can be expected
to oppose the bills more strongly, for example because large acceptance rate
could trigger stricter legislation in the future.
Another economic effect that was mentioned during the campaign is the
direct impact of the bills on the gasoline price. Hence, households relying
heavily on private transport should react negatively towards the proposals. We
therefore include the proportion of the population that reported to be using
a car as their main means of transportation to go to work (Swiss National
Census 2000). This is crucial as work-related commuting with a private car
represents around half of the daily total mobility in Switzerland (Kaufmann,
Jemelin & Guidez 2001).
The classification of some additional measures of the structural composi-
tion of each commune is less clear. Especially for education the concern is
apparent: economists usually posit that better educated citizens are on the
one hand more patient with regards to their entry into the labor market, and
on the other hand that they, once in the labor market, belong to the highly
qualified and thus better paid wage earners. Consequently, in many studies ed-
ucation proxies unobserved job characteristics. In turn, less educated workers
will oppose environmental proposals most notably because they might expe-
rience a decline in earnings, for example through intersectoral redistribution
(Felder & Schleiniger 2002).
In the present configuration, we have ample evidence of price and income
effects with the variables included in our model, so that we are able to treat
education as a control variable. Nevertheless, if education is seen as a proxy
for the discount rate of voters, it is still expected to have a strong impact since
it alters the terms of the individual cost-benefit analysis and has been proven
to influence significantly and positively environmental voting decisions (e.g.
Deacon & Shapiro 1975, Thalmann 2004, Kahn & Matsusaka 1997, Sciarini,
Bornstein & Lanz 2007). We include the proportion of the population with
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a relatively high level of education (high school degree, higher professional
degree, university degree).
2.4 Identifying ideology effects
A much noted study by Kahn & Matsusaka (1997) emphasizes that the de-
mand for the environment is driven by self-interest where ideology compo-
nents act merely as proxies for deeper economic interests. But for the topic
of study here, the diffuse nature of the environmental benefit makes this ap-
proach questionable. For example, the unilateral reduction of Switzerland’s
CO2-emissions would have provided only a limited contribution to the effort
needed to slow the increase of global CO2 concentration in the atmosphere. As
for any public good, a purely self-interested individual would rather free-ride
on the provisions of others than contribute to emissions abatement.
However, it is argued that the demand for resource protection must in part
be explained by notions of the common good and cannot be treated solely
from an economic self-interest perspective (Sagoff 2003). Human actions are
conceived to be rule- or norms-based where these rules associate particular
identities to particular situations and comprise a specific conception of self
(March & Olsen 1998, Elster 1989).
Indeed, it has been shown that preferences for left-libertarian values drive
acceptance of environmental regulation (van Liere & Dunlap 1980, Neumayer
2004) and that political affinity, divided along the distributional axis, is among
the variables with the strongest positive impact on environmental voting
(Fischel 1979, Anderson &Mizak 2006, Sciarini, Bornstein & Lanz 2007). Con-
sider that the Left adopted essential left-libertarians’ claims during the 1980s
(Kitschelt 1989) - most notably the ecology agenda - and incorporated them
into their respective party programs (Sciarini & Finger 1991, Neumayer 2004).
Thus, a left-libertarian vision of society where markets and allocation of re-
sources are not the central premises but where protection of natural resources,
feminism, and anti-nuclear politics are equally important in democratic de-
liberation (Kitschelt 1989, 1994), is supported by roughly 30% of the Swiss
electorate. Since we assume left and green voters, as represented by the elected
officials, to be decisive for approval, we include the share of votes gained by
left and green parties in the national elections 1999.
Furthermore, we employ a measure for what we call ‘habitual green behav-
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Table 2.2: Five ballot propositions used in the composite variable
Date Title Approval
20.02.1994 Referendum on the increase and prolongation of
a highway tax
68.5%
20.02.1994 Popular Initiative to protect the Alps from tran-
sit traffic
51.9%
27.09.1998 Referendum concerning an incentive tax on
trucks
57.2%
29.11.1998 Referendum concerning the financing of public
transport
63.5%
12.03.2000 Popular Initiative to cut motorized traffic in half
to improve living space
21.3%
ior’, measuring a general inclination of each commune towards environmental
bills. It is measured as the average communal acceptance rate of the last five
environmental ballots voted on at the national level. By using such a mea-
sure we control for each commune’s specific behavior towards green legislation
in the last decade. Thus it provides us with an approximation of what the
‘environmental conscience’ could be comprised of and serves as our second
‘ideological’ variable. Table 2.2 recapitulates the five ballot propositions, the
date of vote and the respective acceptance rates.
Although all five ballot propositions were concerned with questions relating
to traffic in the broadest sense, there are nevertheless remarkable differences
between the bills. The two referendums with the highest approval rates (nos. 1
& 4) were contested only minimally by the main political actors. The first dealt
with a prolongation of the highway tax charge, whereas the second provided
for an infrastructure fund to finance large public transport projects.
The acceptance of the initiative to protect the Alps from transit traffic
(no. 2) came very unexpectedly. Moderate and conservative parties, and
private and freight traffic interest associations opposed the bill, which has
been launched by the ecology movement and only gained partisan support
from the Social Democratic Party, the Greens and the Far Left (representing
ca. 30% of the electorate). The vote on the referendum on the incentive tax
on trucks (no. 3) remained very much contested until the day of the vote.
Freight transportation interest groups launched a heavy political campaign
in the run-up to the vote, claiming that consumer prices would soar upon
introduction of the tax. They were backed up by the conservative right and
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some cantonal fractions of the Liberals. Nevertheless, the referendum passed.
Finally, the initiative to cut traffic in half (no. 5) had not the slightest chance
of approval as its implementation was deemed unrealistic.
We argue that the choice on these five bills was differentiated enough to
reflect orthogonal economic interests from the taxes under study. In other
words, following the logic of the median voter theorem, we see the costs and
benefits of each proposal as differentiated enough to avoid measuring the same
choice. Hence the averaged variations between the communes provide valuable
information on the general stance towards the willingness to contribute to an
environmental public good. Note also that the covariance of the averaged
voting behavior with the share of left and green voters is 0.27 (p = 0.000),
which corroborates the elements just reviewed. Finally, the timing of the
votes and the fact that the projects were not altogether accepted or rejected
prevents the composite variable from being endogenous in the analyzed choice
(for a similar application see Weck-Hannemann 1990, Anson & Cadot 2004).
2.5 Econometric specification
As already mentioned, we use aggregate cross-section data to control for house-
hold characteristics on municipal level. The large number of communes (nearly
3000) allows us obtaining precise estimates, even in the obvious presence of
multicollinearity among variables.
We model the participation and choice on each project as a joint decision
by voters. Indeed, the present configuration suggests viewing the three propo-
sitions as a simultaneous choice made with the same amount of information.
However, as other projects were presented to voters on the same day at the
federal, cantonal and communal level, the choice to participate in the three
ballots under review is only indirectly linked with the voting decision. In
other words, observed outcomes cannot be seen as endogenous, even though
the decision is simultaneous.
In order to account for this indirect link, we use Zellner’s (1962) Seemingly
Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE), where each of the three projects is
modeled by separate equations and the participation as a fourth. Within
this model, the four choices are linked through unobserved heterogeneity by
allowing for a non-diagonal variance-covariance matrix.
The dependent variables are the logistic transformed share of favorable
2.5. Econometric specification 25
answers for each ballot and the mean participation rate in each commune.5
Formally, we explain the variations of
y1 = ln(
y0
1− y0 ) (2.1)
where y0 is the observed proportion, and y1 is the logit of y0. As this
model is heteroskedastic by construction, a two step procedure is required in
order to obtain efficient estimates and correct expressions for their standard
deviations. The endogenous weights can be defined as
wi = [niyˆi(1− yˆi)]0.5 (2.2)
where ni is the population of commune i and yˆi is the OLS estimated
proportion (Greene 1999).
The estimated relations are summarized by the following equations.
yij = αj + Ciδj + Eiγj + Iiλj + uij (2.3)
yiP = αP +XiβP + uiP (2.4)
Equation 2.3 stands for the three voting decisions. The dependent vari-
ables are noted yij , where i and j index the communes and projects respec-
tively. The control variables, i.e. the proportion of female, young (18-30
years), elderly (60+), French-speaking, education (high school degree or high-
er), a dummy for communes with more than 20,000 inhabitants as an indicator
of urbanity, and a dummy variable for the canton of ‘Graubünden’, which was
found to have many outliers among its communes, are denoted by Ci. Ei
stands for the vector of economic determinants, which are income and income
squared,6 employment sectors and car commuters. The ideological variables
5We assume that citizens decided to participate in the three ballots or did not participate
at all. As there was no substantial variation in the participation rates between ballots, this
simplification does not influence our estimation. This assumption is supported by the results
of the post-referendum VOX-study (Ballmer-Cao, Eggli, Konishi, Lanszki & Marquis 2000).
6Higher order income terms were also used but revealed to be statistically unimportant
and were not used in the final specification.
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left and green party shares, and habitual green voting behavior, are denoted
by Ii. Finally, αj , δj , γj and λj are the parameters to be estimated and uij is
the error term.
The participation decision is represented by equation 2.4, where we use
a different set of explanatory variables, noted Xi. This vector contains a set
of control variables together with a dummy for observations in the canton of
Schaffhausen (where voting is compulsory) and the average participation for
the five preceding referendum days.7 The remaining notation follows the same
canvas as for the choice equations.
2.6 The relative importance of the two approaches
In order to assess the respective impacts of the two approaches we will first
present results of the model including control variables and such pertaining
to price and income, before commenting on the full model which includes the
ideology-related variables, too.
Generally, we find a very similar pattern for the three different tax schemes.
This corresponds to the fact that a majority of the citizens either accepted or
rejected the projects, with the exception of the solar initiative which received
around 10% less yes-votes. Note that for all models estimated, the variance-
covariance matrix is statistically different from a diagonal matrix (Breusch-
Pagan test, p = 0.000), which confirms the implicit link between the equations.
Environmental demand with price and income effect
The inclusion of socio-demographic and economic variables explains a large
portion of the variance. The R2 is the lowest for the energy conservation
package at 42%, whereas the covariates explain 55% of the variance for the
green tax reform and 69% for the participation equation.
The impact of the proportion of women voters on the three bills is positive
and highly significant, and the impact on the voting outcome is large when
compared to other coefficients. While we are unable to account for the effect in
its entire scope, some facts can help understand this result. Notably, Switzer-
land is still shaped by rather traditional role-sharing which emphasizes the
7Specification for the participation equation is taken from Weck-Hannemann (1990).
This shortcut is not prejudicial for our estimation as we only control for the participation
effect.
2.6. The relative importance of the two approaches 27
Ta
bl
e
2.
3:
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
co
effi
ci
en
ts
(S
U
R
E)
,l
og
ist
ic
W
LS
,p
ric
e
an
d
in
co
m
e
eff
ec
ts
on
ly
W
ei
gh
te
d
m
ea
n
So
la
r
In
it.
s.e
.
En
er
gy
C
on
s.
s.e
.
G
re
en
ta
x
s.e
.
Pa
rt
.
s.e
.
C
on
st
an
t
-
-2
.0
62
**
*
0.
21
8
-0
.8
05
**
*
0.
18
9
-0
.9
13
**
*
0.
19
4
-1
.8
52
**
*
0.
11
6
G
en
de
r
0.
51
2.
55
5*
**
0.
40
1
1.
82
6*
**
0.
34
8
2.
01
5*
**
0.
35
7
-0
.1
83
0.
22
5
Yo
un
g
0.
18
8
-1
.3
9*
**
0.
26
3
-0
.8
16
**
*
0.
22
9
-1
.0
89
**
*
0.
23
4
0.
24
4*
0.
13
9
El
de
rly
0.
25
3
-0
.0
86
0.
16
8
-0
.3
92
**
*
0.
14
6
-0
.4
31
**
*
0.
15
-0
.4
78
**
*
0.
08
6
Fr
en
ch
0.
20
4
-0
.2
79
**
*
0.
02
1
-0
.1
49
**
*
0.
01
9
-0
.5
31
**
*
0.
01
9
-0
.2
96
**
*
0.
01
2
G
ra
ub
ün
de
n
0.
02
6
0.
29
1*
**
0.
03
2
0.
44
7*
**
0.
02
7
0.
43
3*
**
0.
02
8
-
-
U
rb
an
ity
0.
25
1
0.
15
7*
**
0.
03
0
0.
05
2*
*
0.
02
6
0.
10
3*
**
0.
02
7
0.
05
7*
**
0.
01
58
Ed
uc
at
io
n
0.
17
9
2.
40
2*
**
0.
14
0
2.
27
4*
**
0.
12
2
2.
27
7*
**
0.
12
5
-0
.1
0.
07
4
C
ar
co
m
m
ut
er
0.
43
1
-1
.2
13
**
*
0.
07
4
-1
.0
67
**
*
0.
06
4
-1
.2
05
**
*
0.
06
6
-
-
Fo
ss
il
fu
el
s
1.
18
e-
4
-1
.0
52
2.
32
1
-3
.2
72
2.
01
8
-3
.0
23
2.
06
5
-
-
El
ec
tr
ic
ity
0.
00
7
-2
.1
81
**
*
0.
46
6
-0
.6
18
0.
40
6
-1
.0
92
**
*
0.
41
5
-
-
Pa
pe
r
0.
00
5
-1
.4
76
**
0.
68
0
-1
.4
01
**
0.
59
1
-0
.3
07
0.
60
5
-
-
C
he
m
ic
al
s
0.
02
4
0.
97
1*
**
0.
20
7
0.
21
8
0.
18
0
0.
27
5
0.
18
4
-
-
M
in
in
g
0.
03
6
0.
62
9*
**
0.
19
2
-0
.3
88
**
0.
16
7
-0
.0
15
0.
17
0
-
-
Tr
an
sp
or
t
0.
02
6
1.
71
8*
**
0.
38
3
0.
86
5*
**
0.
33
3
0.
42
8
0.
34
1
-
-
In
co
m
e
23
.4
59
0.
02
8*
**
0.
00
6
0.
00
7
0.
00
5
0.
01
6*
**
0.
00
5
0.
01
**
*
0.
00
1
In
co
m
e2
57
3.
96
8
-7
.5
e-
4*
**
1.
1e
-4
-3
.5
e-
4*
**
0.
92
e-
4
-4
.6
e-
4*
**
0.
94
e-
4
-
-
Le
ft-
gr
ee
n
0.
28
3
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
En
v.
be
ha
vi
or
0.
52
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
3.
65
3*
**
0.
05
7
Sc
ha
ffh
au
se
n
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.
28
4*
**
0.
03
6
N
28
26
28
26
28
26
28
26
A
dj
us
te
d
R
2
0.
42
2
0.
42
1
0.
55
2
0.
69
2
*p
≤
.1
**
p≤
.0
5
**
*p
≤
.0
1
28 Voting on the Environment: Price or Ideology?
male bread-winner model and a welfare regime which responded rather late
to new social demands, such as a federal maternity insurance which only en-
tered into force in 2004 (Häusermann 2006). Thus, women in Switzerland
might be less exposed to the labor market which in turn would make them
less vulnerable to economic costs being imposed upon them (van Liere &
Dunlap 1980). Secondly, we are led to believe that the concern for an intact
environment might be stronger with women as they traditionally are more
involved in child-rearing and might therefore show greater conscience towards
questions of intergenerational equity and discounting (Hepburn 2006). It will
therefore be crucial to see the impact of the ideology-orientated variables on
this coefficient to disentangle the effects.
The coefficient for young voters has a negative impact and is highly signif-
icant for all three proposals. We thus refute the assumption of younger birth
cohorts supporting post-materialist values such as the protection of the envi-
ronment (Inglehart 1995). However, in the light of a participation rate of only
30% for young voters (Ballmer-Cao et al. 2000) the risk of putting too big an
emphasis on this measure is evident. For older voters the picture looks similar:
as we expected, our results seem to imply that older age groups did not want
to carry costs for future generations as the coefficients are all negative (for the
solar initiative the coefficient does not attain statistical significance).
The French-speaking proportion variable is also negative and statistically
highly significant. Taking into account societal factors influencing ecological
consciousness in Switzerland, we could also imagine this variable to be in-
fluenced more strongly by ideological considerations: traditionally, language
groups in Switzerland orientate themselves according to their neighboring lan-
guage homologues (cf. Maddison 2006). In Germany the resistance to nuclear
technology in the 1970s laid the groundwork for a strong environmental move-
ment inside and outside the political arena which eventually led to the for-
mation of the Greens (Kitschelt 1986). On the other hand, to this day no
powerful ecological party has formed at the national level in France. This
might to some extent account for the reasons why French-speaking voters’
demand for green policy is smaller than the Swiss-Germans’ demand (see also
Kriesi 1996).
Additionally, we notice a second regional effect: the coefficient for the
dummy variable for the canton of Graubünden is statistically significant and
positive for all three bills. Ceteris paribus, communes in this canton were on
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average between 6-11% more favorable to the proposals (see marginal effects
in the appendix, Table A.1). Graubünden is a mountainous canton, heavily
dependent on tourism and one of the largest producer of hydroelectric power.
Furthermore, the canton possesses 46% of shares of Graubünden’s largest elec-
tricity producer, ‘Rätia Energie’ which is one of the biggest providers and
promoters of green electricity in Switzerland. Their ecologically conscious
electricity ‘PurePower’ was launched in the electricity market ahead of other
competitors and the company is one of the market leaders in the provision of
green energy. Thus, considering the aforementioned, the households’ positive
stance towards the proposals makes all the more sense. Interestingly, even the
cantonal party sections of the populist right Swiss People’s Party (UDC) and
of the Radical Party (PRD) supported the two counterproposals - in stark
contrast to the national parties’ voting recommendations.
The coefficients for urbanity are all positive and statistically significant,
although with a small effect. It comes as no surprise that urban households
are more inclined to vote in favor of green policy as they are less dependent
on private mobility (Hammar & Jagers 2007) and value open leisure space
higher than people living in rural areas which are often dependent on the
exploitation of natural resources to make a living. But as we will see in
the following section, this effect will disappear entirely when we include the
measures of ideology.
As expected, we can confirm the importance of education when it comes
to the acceptance of environmental ballots. The proportion of the population
with a higher education is confirmed to have a strong impact on the voting
outcome. We mentioned above that education often proxies for unobserved
job characteristics (Kahn 2002, Kahn & Matsusaka 1997). But because our
model controls for regional employment distribution and the income level, this
result seems to indicate the genuine importance of the education level in the
willingness to contribute to the provision of environmental goods. Although
this finding suggests that more investigation is needed to understand the un-
derlying motivation, we favor the explanation that posits an inherent link
between higher education and the discount rate, giving less weight to short
term financial arguments raised during the campaign. Thalmann (2004) also
suggested that higher education provides for the capacity to evaluate risks and
long-term costs of environmental quality.
Turning to the variables related to price and income, we observe that the
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use of a personal car as main means to commute has a strong negative impact
on approval rates (Hammar & Jagers 2007). Households who rely on their car
to go to work demonstrated their unwillingness to pay more for commuting
by rejecting the proposals more heavily. So long as public transport does not
pose a cheaper or equal alternative to private commuting, these citizens will
presumably not alter preferences (Kaufmann, Jemelin & Guidez 2001).
The six economic sectors we included are all traditionally energy-intensive
and generally fulfill their role of price proxies well. Notably regions with a
larger proportion of workers in the sectors of fossil energy, electricity, pa-
per production and the mining industry opposed the three proposals more
strongly. These variables generally display a negative and highly statistically
significant coefficient, which can be interpreted as a fear for a general eco-
nomic degradation in regions where industries depend more heavily on energy
production and use. Note that these effects are detected even with the small
proportion and variations of the labor force in the respective sectors.
Interestingly, these price effects are observed despite exemption schemes
set up in the bills. This could be the sign either of a misunderstanding or
a will to manifest a general opposition to policies implying a higher energy
price, as workers in these sectors probably felt threatened by the bills - be it a
real or subjective threat. This point remains speculative as we are not able to
control for the voting motivation. Nevertheless, employment considerations
appear to be crucial for the approval of future policy regulating relative prices
of energy (Schneider & Volkert 1999, Bornstein & Thalmann 2007).
Two sectors display rather surprising results. First, communes with work-
force in the chemical sectors seemed to favor the three projects, although the
effect is significant for the solar initiative only. Second, the transport sec-
tor variable has a positive impact on the voting outcome and is statistically
significant at the one percent level for two of the three projects. A possible
explanation lies in the fact that a significant proportion of people working in
the transport sector actually work for public transport. Consequently, this
variable sends a mixed signal, as a part of the measured proportion has no
work-related incentive to refuse the taxes since they could eventually gain
from an increased demand for public transportation.
The final economic determinant, also seen as one of the fundamental de-
terminants of the environmental demand, is the citizens’ disposable income
(Fischel 1979, Kahn 2002, Buchanan & Tullock 1975). In line with the litera-
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Figure 2.2: Acceptance rates of the bills conditional on income, weighted
sample mean
ture, Figure 2.2 shows that our specification for the income variable suggests
an inverted u-shaped relationship between the average communal taxable in-
come and the acceptance of the projects. It is often argued that the environ-
ment is a normal good, but that the richest households do not necessarily show
greater acceptance of environmental regulation either because they must bear
a larger share of the burden of environmental protection (Thalmann 2004) or
because wealthier people can afford to live in areas of higher environmental
quality (Kahn 2002).
When plotting acceptance rates against income we observe that the turn-
ing point for approval is situated at a yearly gross income per tax payer of
CHF 18,000 to 20,000 for the solar initiative and green tax reform, and be-
tween CHF 10,000 and 12,000 for the energy conservation package.8 Hence,
while there were few indications of an income effect at the individual level
(Thalmann 2004), in the present setting we detect a statistically significant
effect, albeit very small. Hence the marginal effect of income is positive for
small income levels but becomes negative for the communes with the highest
income level. At the (weighted) sample mean, an increase of CHF 1,000 in-
8Note that our income measure has a weighted average of CHF 23,460 and a weighted
median of CHF 22,900 (interquartile range CHF 5,740).
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creases the probability of acceptance of the green tax reform by 0.2% if the
income variable is set at CHF 9,000 whereas it decreases by 0.5% for an income
of CHF 40,000 (see the appendix, Table A.1).
Introducing ideology - unraveling the puzzle?
The second model includes our two variables which control for the ideological
or ‘common good’ effect. Because we assume that the decisions contained in
these variables reflected different interests from those underlying the choice
presently analyzed, we can interpret the results of this specification as if every
commune had the same political affinity and residual environmental behavior.
Hence, the changes of the coefficients allow us to point out the variables that
relate to price and income effects and such that pertain to the notion of the
common good.
We first note that the explained variance is relatively high, as we explain
between 58% and 68% of the variance of the three outcomes. The adjusted
R2 increases by 17.9% for the solar initiative, by 15.8% for the energy conser-
vation package, by 13.6% for the green tax reform while obviously estimated
participation stays the same. Note that participation seems to be explained
very well with the variables presented in the equation.
As expected, the coefficient for the main political-ideological variable, the
percentage of votes gained by leftist and green parties in national elections
is strongly positive and highly statistically significant. This supports our
hypothesis on the importance of integrating variables going further than em-
ployment and income effects. Furthermore, the average result of the last
five nation-wide environmental ballots, proxying for people’s green behavior,
displays encouraging results. The effect of the predictor is positive and the
marginal effect is relatively strong for all three bills. In our opinion, this
last point illustrates that there is an environmental awareness inherent to all
communes which is not directly measurable in terms of price effects. By prox-
ying the results of a pure ecological ballot with the previous vote choice on
environmental ballots allows to control for a general environmental behavior.
However, we are aware that the trend does not explain behavior. Directly
speaking, one choice does not explain the other. More research would be
needed to determine the heterogeneity underlying this variable, but control-
ling for this effect is fundamental in obtaining unbiased estimates for the other
variables.
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Most of the ‘socio-demographic’ coefficients are robust; however, some
noteworthy exceptions apply. Remark that the difference between men and
women vanishes once ideological variables are introduced, as the coefficient is
not statistically significant at the 5%-level. This result points to the fact that
the gender question only plays a role when we control for price and income
effects - knowing that women in Switzerland are still heavily disadvantaged in
the labor market. Because the votes included in the composite variable would
have had only a limited impact on the employment market, we conclude that
the gender effect of the price model can be attributed to ideological effects
(van Liere & Dunlap 1980).
In line with a study by Salka (2001), we find that urbanity effects get can-
celled out upon the introduction of ideological variables. Thus, we are able to
confirm that differences between urban and rural regions are rooted in more
general lifestyle differences linked to demographic and ideological character-
istics (for similar findings see Kriesi 1999). In fact, these results support the
ideological explanation for gender and urbanity effects rather than the price
proxy explanation.
Concerning the price proxies, we also find that the estimated coefficients
are robust across specifications. In general, we observe that the price proxies
have effects that are more consistent with prior expectations once ideology is
introduced. Indeed, almost all industrial sectors show a negative sign or are
not statistically different from zero.9 This supports the assertion that workers
in energy intensive sectors followed the employers’ associations rather than
their trade unions in this particular vote for fear of economic losses (Schneider
& Volkert 1999). The former gave out a negative voting recommendation,
warning of a decrease in production upon implementation of the taxes - an
argument of great importance to workers - while the latter were in favor of the
taxes aiming to shift the tax burden from labor to energy.10 Therefore, this
result seems to confirm the strong price effect associated with employment
considerations.
Although all the price variables have the expected impact, the income effect
9The only exception is the coefficient of the chemical industry in the solar initiative
equation.
10Note that the taxes were rejected heavily by all important employers organizations on
the grounds that the CO2-law, which had entered into force five months earlier, already
covered major claims by the ecology movement and that thus these three taxes became
extraneous and harmful to the Swiss economy.
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virtually disappears from this specification. This result points at a weakness
of our approach, since it might be due to the systematic relation between
the income level and the choice. Indeed, the inverted u-shaped relationship
between income and the acceptance of environmental ballots has been shown
to be quite robust, and Kahn & Matsusaka (1997) find that pattern in 12 out
of 13 of the projects they study. This was confirmed by running a regression
of our composite variable on a quadratic income function and some control
variables, as a concave relationship between income and environmental voting
is also supported by the data.
On the whole, our results seem to point into a different direction than
those obtained by Kahn & Matsusaka (1997) who state that ‘... while price
and income can explain most of the variation, it seems that party preferences
can be useful in explaining some of the residual variation’ (p. 161, emphasis
added). On the contrary, following our estimations, non-economic variables
seem to explain an important part of the choice. Moreover, the coefficients of
the socio-demographic and price variables in this full specification are more
consistent with a priori cost-benefit arguments, suggesting that not controlling
for ideological factors can induce a bias. However, a caveat applies which
the above authors assert too: it is not possible to determine whether party
proxies for unmeasured price or ideology effects not taken into account. But we
highlight the fact that citizens adhering to left-libertarian values have rather
pronounced ideas of their belief system: they defend a vision of society where
markets and resource allocation are not the central cleavages but where the
protection of the environment is equally important (Kitschelt 1989, Carter
2006).
2.7 Conclusion
The objective of this study was to establish whether conceptions of price and
income effects are sufficient in explaining the demand for environmental qual-
ity or whether it is advised to consider a logic of appropriateness, too. We
designed two distinct models; the first one accounts for price and income ef-
fects whereas the second one also controls for ideological components of the
vote. Whereas the economics profession asserts that ideology merely acts as
proxy for deeper underlying price and income effects (Kahn 2002, Kahn &
Matsusaka 1997), there are doubts as to whether this conception of man,
36 Voting on the Environment: Price or Ideology?
which is rooted in cost-benefit analysis, is not too narrowly derived. Sagoff
(2003, p. 590) then also contends that ‘ ... people base their preferences less
on what they believe will benefit them than on what they judge is good in
itself, meets certain standards or norms, suits the identity or character of their
community, or conforms with principles appropriate to the circumstances’. By
stressing the importance of social man and collective choice we do not inval-
idate assumptions underlying neoclassical economic theory (cf. Vatn 2005).
Our point is that following a logic of appropriateness might constitute a com-
plementary path to the citizen when he is faced with making a choice; in
our case this means making a choice pertaining to resource allocation which
implies an increase in the relative price of fossil energy.
In the light of ever-growing global environmental concern, the use of market-
based instruments is growing. Nevertheless, the three taxes on no-renewable
energy in Switzerland in the year 2000 did not gain popular majority. What
happened? Firstly, on the political side, the proposals did not receive unani-
mous support from major political actors inside and outside the parliamentary
arena, especially not the major employers’ organizations. However, their sup-
port is crucial to the acceptance of ballot proposals (Kriesi 2005, Halbheer,
Niggli & Schmutzler 2006, Bornstein 2007). Secondly, the introduction of the
Swiss CO2-law and the vote on the three proposals in the same year made it
impossible for the economic milieux to support the ballot proposals, as they
argued that the CO2-law already fulfilled all the claims posited in the pro-
posals. Thirdly, we recognize that the energy-intensive sectors, which would
have been exempted from the tax, and the employers’ representatives were
hostile to the taxes, too - be it because they feared economic losses, stricter
legislation in the future or because the design of the tax was not understood
correctly. Finally, it appears that the time for incentive taxes was not right:
the introduction of an incentive tax as part of the CO2-law would have been
possible in 2004, however, the industry managed to circumvent this legal pro-
vision by concluding voluntary agreements with the government (Thalmann
& Baranzini 2008). After lengthy obstruction, a rather modest incentive tax
on combustibles will enter into force in 2008.
Our analysis uncovers some of the central covariates of the vote by using a
SURE model which differentiated between the voting decision and the partic-
ipation. We used aggregate, municipal-level data. Our results, then, point to
the possibility of two, not necessarily mutually exclusive paths in explaining
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the popular acceptability of environmental policy. While energy intensive in-
dustrial sectors, older people and such commuting to work by car are observed
to be less supportive of ecological tax reforms, education and political affinity
are balancing the price-related effect for a commodity like environmental qual-
ity. In turn, we were able to show that analyses which focus solely on price
and income effects might be committing a shortcut which we deem being too
extreme. Indeed, our model with ideological variables fares much better than
the one including price and income only, both in terms of statistical fit and
according to the signs of the price variables. In other words, not including
ideological measures could lead to an omitted variable bias.
In the light of a vote which was not only very complex to the electorate
(three thinly differentiated bills) but also encountered considerable politico-
economic opposition, the refusal of the three bills comes as no surprise. This
has little impact on our findings, though, since our goal was to analyze the
variability of the responses and show which role price and ideology effects,
respectively, have on aggregate voting choice. And to this question, we believe,
we are able to provide a satisfactory answer: economic rationality matters
in the light of a decision on a project which would have entailed costs to
households in order to do something for the common good, but the role of
norms and institutions on vote choice is of great significance.
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3 ‘I pay enough taxes already!’ Applying
Economic Voting Models to Environmental
Referendums
This chapter is a slightly modified version of a paper written together with
Philippe Thalmann (Bornstein & Thalmann 2007), which is accepted for pub-
lication pending revisions at Social Science Quarterly.
Abstract
In traditional cost-benefit analyses citizens’ voting behavior on environ-
mental policy can be seen as being influenced by the business cycle. To
test this assumption the present study examines the personal, institu-
tional and economic determinants of vote choice on 36 environmental
bills from 1983 to 2004. We apply a logistic hierarchical model and con-
firm the crucial importance of the individual-level variables education,
political affinity, car ownership and urbanity. We then classify the elec-
torate into five groups using open-ended survey questions about respon-
dents’ reasons for approval or dismissal of the bills. The survey answers
let us posit hypotheses referring to the impact of economic conditions on
the specific motivation groups. Furthermore, institutional and economic
context variables are added on a second level: in summary, we are able
to show that a better perception of current economic conditions has a
positive effect on the vote. In turn, we prove the negative, constrain-
ing effect of deteriorating macro-economic conditions on approval rates.
Hence, by applying economic voting models to referendum analyses we
advance the understanding of citizens’ choice on environmental policy.
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3.1 Introduction
Analyses of referendums and elections usually rely on socio-structural data
reflecting individuals’ characteristics such as political preferences, education
and income. While these personal traits and preferences transmit traditional
indicators crucial for the vote choice, we cannot neglect that a considerable
portion of information is withheld. As it is, we have at our disposal a database
of post-referendum surveys from 1983 to 2004, the so called VOX-data, which
not only asks for citizens’ preferences and characteristics but also requires
them to motivate their voting decision. Thus, making use of citizens’ stated
voting motives in the survey provides a unique opportunity to learn more
about people’s underlying motives beyond party ID and other usual suspects.
We use this information to create a typology of the electorate which is rooted
theoretically in the literature of economic voting and in the Public Choice
tradition.
The voter typology was established mainly for the following reasons: first,
we believe that there are hidden arguments which can be captured neither
with micro- nor with macro-level variables. Having direct access to people’s
motives on acceptance or rejection of proposals therefore enriches our model on
environmental vote choice. Second, our arguments laid out in the theoretical
part which we use to define the groups, challenge the common public choice
approach often used in environmental voting analyses. We are able to show
that cost-benefit analysis is an important though not the preponderant factor
on citizens’ choice many scholars believe it to be.
Several, though not many, papers analyzed environmental voting out-
comes (e.g. Deacon & Shapiro 1975, Kahn & Matsusaka 1997, Fischel 1979,
Thalmann 2004). In the public choice tradition, they sought to discriminate
personal characteristics that could explain why some voters expected to gain
from an environmental proposal while others did not. Similarly, general elec-
tion outcomes in Western democracies have often been explained advancing
monetary, i.e. economic arguments as being crucial to the vote. Almost no
attention has been paid to how economic conditions affect support for ballot
propositions, though (for an exception see Bowler & Donovan 1998, chapter
4). Indeed, research has shown that voters’ choices in elections are heavily
influenced by retrospective evaluations of economic conditions (Kramer 1971,
Kinder & Kiewiet 1981) and that a differentiation between pocketbook and
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sociotropic voters is advisable, i.e. between those who care about personal
economic welfare vs. those who care about national economic predicaments
(Kinder, Adams & Gronke 1989, Sanders 1991).
Moreover, not only do referendums pertaining to environmental issues en-
tail a personal monetary factor, but they do also, in the view of many voters,
have a considerable impact on national economic performance upon approval.
As Switzerland has known very slow economic growth since the early 1990s
and unemployment rates have been soaring to finally stabilize at rather high
levels today, we expect these effects to have a crucial impact on approval.
This motivates our choice to apply economic voting models to environmental
referendums.
However, many voting analyses neglect the crucial impact the context
exerts on individual decision making. Only few scholars have included aggre-
gate data on a second level to augment the traditional individual-level model
(Jones, Johnston & Pattie 1992, Kriesi 2005, Sciarini, Bornstein & Lanz 2007).
By modeling contextual characteristics in multilevel models we are able to
control for institutional and economic factors going beyond preference-based
assumptions.
Following this introduction, Section 3.2 will outline the theoretical frame-
work. A description of the five motivation groups is given before turning to
the hypotheses. In Section 3.3 we undertake the classification of the electorate
and discuss first results thereof. Consequently, the econometric model and the
data used for the study are introduced in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents
the estimations’ results and their interpretation, before concluding the paper
in the last Section.
3.2 Voting motives
Switzerland practices a high level of direct democracy and is characterized as
a ‘consensus democracy’ (Lĳphart 1999).1 Its citizens are called, on average,
three times a year to vote on several proposals of amendments to the Con-
stitution or new laws. They often bear directly or indirectly on government
finances, spending and public management.
Singling out the policy domain of environmental protection and sustain-
1For recent English-language explanations, see Trechsel & Kriesi (1996) and Kriesi
(2005).
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Electorate
Cue-takers
Cost-benefit 
considerations
Ideologues
Pocketbook voting:
Selfish voters 
Sociotropic
voting
Here-and-now 
voters
Anticipating voters
Figure 3.1: Classification of the electorate into voter groups
ability allows refined hypotheses-testing using the open-ended survey responses
in the VOX-data. To this end, we define the five motivation groups which are
rooted in the economic voting literature and in the public choice tradition.
A simple graph illustrates our model of decision-making on environmental
ballots.
The literature repeatedly stresses the fact that voters do not possess gen-
eral attitudes that are structured across different issues to form so called ‘con-
strained belief systems’ (Converse 1964). Nevertheless, the concept of political
ideology seems to have survived even the most intense critics. Anyhow, schol-
ars acknowledge that the citizenry’s ability to make reasoned choices is rather
limited (Luskin 1990). As a way out of this cognitive ability-trap citizens are
believed to reason their decision in part by relying on heuristic cues and short-
cuts (Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock 1991). These can be based for instance on
risk aversion which implies a general tendency of opposing change, thus voting
no on ballot propositions (Bowler & Donovan 1998). Often, badly informed
voters will also follow an interest group’s voting recommendation or an indus-
try’s position to emulate the behavior of citizens disposing of greater political
knowledge (Lupia 1994). Others have argued that political parties serve as a
reliable and not very costly shortcut to decision-making (Downs 1957), but
voters might also follow their government’s recommendations when casting a
vote (Kriesi 2005). Moreover, it is generally accepted that the elites play a
major role in individuals’ opinion formation process: voters will inter alia base
their choice on the direction of the debate in the public arena, where unanim-
ity of the elite’s position towards a project greatly enhances the probability
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of a vote in the same direction, this especially for citizens disposing of high
political awareness (Zaller 1992). In the Swiss context, the negative influence
a polarized elite has on acceptance rates is underlined by various studies (see
e.g. Sciarini 2006, Sciarini, Bornstein & Lanz 2007). But not only the divi-
sion of the elites is detrimental to approval of projects at ballots, but also
the fact that people express difficulty in responding to the question at hand,
i.e. when their understanding of the project is limited they tend to reject the
proposal (Sciarini & Marquis 2000). Following this discussion we can define
the first group of our typology, namely the Cue-takers. They follow their ‘gut
feeling’ or short-cuts and cues such as voting recommendations given by the
authorities or by their reference political or environmental organization.2
Additionally, we claim that ideological voters’ convictions need not be
overruled by concerns for the associated costs; a significant part of the elec-
torate will follow an ideological position when voting even if it is based only
on a simple slogan, void of sophisticated reasoning. Thus, our second group,
the Ideologues decide on moral or political principles or slogans and are in fa-
vor of any environmental policy without consideration for costs. Then again,
they could also oppose any government intervention aiming to protect the
environment on ideological grounds.
As aforementioned, much of the literature on environmental referendums
was carried out in the public choice tradition. The approach, which is the
economist’s model of rational choice and is deeply rooted in utilitarianism,
emphasizes the role of cost-benefit analyses (CBA) on individual decision-
making (Kirchgässner & Schneider 2003, Deacon & Shapiro 1975, Kahn 2002).
When voting on ecological issues, economic concerns may become predomi-
nant and might even overrule the pro-environmental conscience if the costs
associated with the project appear as being too high. The discrepancy be-
tween expressed preferences and actual behavior is particularly striking in
environmental policy. Diekmann & Preisendörfer (1992) call this paradox the
‘low-cost situation’: actions towards protecting natural resources will only be
taken when implied costs for the behavioral change are rather low.
Since our main motive of research is concerned with the impact of chang-
ing micro- and macro-economic conditions on citizens’ environmental voting
2For clarification purposes we describe the cue-takers in a very narrow sense of the term,
in that the other motivations groups which base their choice on evaluations of the economic
situation are not defined as following a cue. We are aware of the danger of excluding
reasoning based on perceptions of the economy from the cue-taking process.
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behavior we situate our analytical framework mostly in the economic voting
literature. Although this strand of literature has been applied mainly to par-
liamentary and presidential elections, we extend the arguments to test how
well the approach fares when studying referendum outcomes. While many
scholars differentiated mainly between the two categories of ‘pocketbook’ vs.
‘sociotropic’ voters, we engage in a more detailed partitioning of the electorate.
Kinder, Adams & Gronke (1989) made a similar point when noting that vot-
ers worry about the future, the past or the present respectively; or that some
worry about unemployment while others are concerned with inflation.
Kinder & Kiewiet’s (1981) seminal paper clarified some central concerns
that are of crucial importance to our analysis: first, we admit that pocketbook
voting is an easily understood concept, ‘which asserts that political preferences
reflect in a direct and immediate way the economic circumstances of private
life’ (Kinder, Adams & Gronke 1989, p. 492). However, this does not make it
less pertinent in any way: drawing on common sense, it remains a strong argu-
ment that citizens following pocketbook considerations watch their personal
financial situation closely and, upon this, reward or punish the incumbent
party.3 The sociotropes, on the other hand, make a decision based mainly
on the nation’s past economic performance. In recent years, the sociotropic
hypothesis has received wider attention and support, while on the other hand
most studies confirm that it would be wrong to discard the possibility of voters
making decisions with a view to their pocketbooks since ‘pocketbook voting
will be more likely among those citizens who see their own problems as having
social or collective causes ... ’ (Kinder & Kiewiet 1981, fn. 56).4
Secondly, it is important to note that the distinction between the two
types of voters is not equivalent to a distinction between a self-interested
and an altruistic choice. Nor does it mean that sociotropes are well-informed
and undertake a sophisticated analysis of macro-economic policy (Kinder &
Kiewiet 1981, Markus 1988), since public opinion research has repeatedly
3Some researchers have even argued that personal self-interest, expressed for instance
through voters’ opinion on their own future economic prospects, outweighs objective indi-
cators of the state of the economy such as unemployment, inflation, interest and exchange
rates (Sanders 1991).
4Although several authors have argued that the difference between pocketbook and so-
ciotropic voting is artifactual (Kramer 1983) and that the pocketbook hypothesis has not
been able to gain much hard evidence (Lewis-Beck 1988, Kinder & Kiewiet 1979), we con-
tend that the affective reactions to the two differ considerably as underlined by Conover
& Feldman (1986). Therefore, we will test for both the impact of personal and collective
economic grievances on environmental voting choices.
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shown the electorate to be indifferent and not very savvy about political life
(Luskin 1990, Converse 1964); rather, they base their judgement on a rough
evaluation of national economic conditions.
Thirdly, sociotropic voting can be led completely by self-interest when a
voter takes the nation’s health as a retrospective indicator of how her own
personal welfare is attributable to the governing party’s politics. Defined in
this way, it is obvious that the difference between the two types of voters is not
one of motivation but of information. Furthermore, a recent study confirmed
the almost equal size of the effects of sociotropic and pocketbook predicaments
on vote choice in Sweden (Jordahl 2006). According to that analysis, pock-
etbook voting accounts for a slightly smaller impact on the decision than the
sociotropic variables. We thus claim that the third group of the electorate,
the Selfish voters, compare the costs and benefits of a proposal mainly for
themselves emphasizing for instance tax hikes, reduced mobility or, on the
other hand, a cleaner environment.
Moreover, turning to the differentiation between retrospective and prospec-
tive voting, we argue in line with Erikson (1989) that a retrospective view of
economic conditions is more easily accessible to the average voter than fore-
casting what effects a future politician’s policy would have on her personal
welfare (cf. Kinder, Adams & Gronke 1989, Fiorina 1981). In other words
‘their [the voters’] prospective choices are rendered retrospective through the
auxiliary assumption that the most obvious and reliable way to form ratio-
nal expectations about the future is by evaluating the parties’ actual past
performance in office’ (Achen & Bartels 2004, p. 7; see also Achen 1992).5
Some objections to this disqualification remain, though. Especially the
work by MacKuen, Erikson & Stimson (1992) asserts the importance of looking
into the immediate economic future. They argue, although also finding partly
support for the retrospective argument, that the electorate is anticipating and
foresighted rather than myopic. Lewis-Beck (1988, pp. 118-125) finds partial
evidence for the prospective voting claim, but urges to apply caution since
impacts of retrospective economic evaluations cannot be ignored. We expect
the fourth category of voters, the Here-and-now voters to compare the current
costs and benefits of a proposal from a sociotropic point of view, emphasizing
5Note however, that we are unable to make this distinction for the pocketbook voters
too, as data provided by the survey organizers is not detailed enough. In other words,
we classify the sociotropic voters into retrospective and prospective voters, but we do not
undertake the task for the ‘selfish voters’.
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for instance impacts on employment, budget, or international competitiveness.
For some sociotropic voters though, we do not negate the possibility of
prospective voting as discussed above (MacKuen, Erikson & Stimson 1992,
Lewis-Beck 1988). Indeed, prospective sociotropic voting is very likely in
environmental policymaking, as a majority of the ballots’ issues were linked
directly or indirectly to questions of sustainability and the security of our
future. Extending the argument somewhat, we contend that these citizens do
not only think of national future economic prospects, i.e. growth, but also
about general questions linked to sustainability and the future of the natural
habitat - our legacy to our descendants - when making a choice. Our last group
therefore, the Anticipating voters, is believed to compare the future costs and
benefits of a proposal from a sociotropic point of view too, but emphasizing
long-term impacts of government policy, i.e. issues linked to sustainability,
land use changes or the impact of a proposal on the future national economic
development.
Table 3.1 provides an overview of the five groups, their theoretical un-
derpinnings, and some examples of responses given. Note that in each group
voters can decide to approve or reject an environmental proposal depending
on how they assess its consequences along their priorities and on how they
weigh those priorities. Therefore, all groups comprise yes- and no-voters.
Personal determinants of voting choice
Most empirical studies undertaken in the context of environmental protec-
tion found a voter’s education and her political preferences to be the most
important determinants when voting on the environment. Early studies in
the 1970s, conducted with aggregate voting data and post referendum survey
data in the United States, showed that environmental projects at ballots were
strongly disapproved by voters with conservative political views (Deacon &
Shapiro 1975, van Liere & Dunlap 1980) but embraced by those with higher
education (Fischel 1979). Those results were confirmed by later empirical
studies in the American and Swiss contexts, as is also shown in Chapter 2
of this thesis (see also Kahn & Matsusaka 1997, Thalmann 2004, Sciarini,
Bornstein & Lanz 2007).
While the above predictors are uncontested by research, other factors such
as the voter’s age and urbanity have been more elusive to interpretation.
One might expect younger voters to be more supportive of environmental
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ballots because they are more concerned by long-term environmental changes
or because they share post-materialist values, but these assumptions were
usually refuted by empirical studies in the Swiss context (Bornstein & Lanz
2007, Thalmann 2004). Nevertheless, we will control whether respondents
giving a voting motivation in terms of prospective voting react differently when
it comes to votes on nuclear power - a typical post-materialist argument. We
believe these questions to be particularly salient to anticipating voters since
they are hard to grasp in terms of a single life-span (i.e. half-life of waste)
and call upon post-material ideals (Inglehart 1977, Kitschelt 1986, 1989).
Furthermore, urban voters might be more favorable to environmental pol-
icy because they are more exposed to nuisances and they value the leisure-
value of open spaces. On the other hand, urbanity is correlated with other
voters’ characteristics such as political affiliation, higher education and income
(Salka 2001). Finally, a variable pertaining to private transport shall control
for utilitarian arguments. We know that people possessing one or several cars
are less likely to accept environmental proposals (Thalmann 2004, Bornstein
& Lanz 2007), be it because they appreciate mobility more or because of
the associated leisure. Consider the fact that citizens not possessing a car
- around 25% in Switzerland - do either make a considerate choice against
private transportation and for the environment (about one third) or do not
possess one due to exogenous factors (i.e. scarce financial situation, preva-
lence of public transport in urban areas, health-related reasons etc.). The
latter comprises about one fifth of the car-free group; the rest of the car-free
people are rather ambivalent with respect to the reasons of not possessing a
car (Müller & Romann 1999).
Hypotheses
After testing assumptions on personal determinants of environmental voting
and on the motivation groups in a single-level model, economic and institu-
tional predictors on level-2 are incorporated. This will allow for more detailed
hypotheses testing, namely the possibility to test cross-level interactions. The
following set of hypotheses will be tested.
H1 - Motivation groups Compared to the ideologues (reference category)
we expect the following effects for the motivation groups:
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1a. Selfish and here-and-now voters will show pronounced negative ef-
fects towards the proposals.
1b. On the other hand, anticipating voters will show a positive effect.
1c. Cue-takers should vote in line with their government, i.e. rather
against the projects.
H2 - Context Institutional and economic time-series predictors:
2a. Effects for the ‘change in consumption climate’ coefficient should
be positive implying that a better economic business cycle promotes peo-
ple’s willingness to pay for the environment.
2b. The contrary applies for the measure of general economic conditions:
rising gasoline prices are expected to decrease ballot support.
2c. For proposals which received unanimous support by the Swiss elites
we expect a higher probability of approval.
H3 - Interactions Cross-level effects between individual and contextual pre-
dictors:
3a. Selfish voters making their choice dependent on the change in the
consumption climate will be incited to vote more strongly in favour of
the proposals as the consumption climate soars.
3b. Similarly, when the here-and-now voters take into account general
economic conditions their rejection of the projects will be offset when gas
prices are lower.
3c. The anticipating voters’ probability of approval of nuclear power ini-
tiatives will be higher than that of the other groups.
3d. Voters using shortcuts will vote even more strongly against the pro-
posals when the elites are divided.
3.3 Data and first results
The VOX surveys
Since 1981 a representative telephone survey has been conducted within three
to four weeks after each national vote (hereafter ‘VOX survey’). Each sur-
vey interviews approximately 1,000 adults following a uniform blueprint aug-
mented by questions specific to each vote. For this study, we pooled the data
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from 19 VOX surveys bearing on 36 environment-related policy proposals put
to vote over the last 21 years (see the list in the appendix).6 The proposals
were voted upon during only 19 weekends, as it is usual in Switzerland to vote
on several different proposals together. Our selection of the projects follows
closely the Swiss Statistical Office’s classification of popular votes into the-
matic groups, using the group ‘Environment & Living Space’. We excluded
votes bearing on genetic engineering, as they pursued very particular and
sometimes fundamentalist goals regarding the human being and the state of
nature. For most proposals, voting yes was voting in favor of some environ-
mental improvement; the two objects for which that was not the case were
recoded accordingly.
The standardization of the surveys results in a stacked dataset, in which a
respondent’s project-specific vote together with her background characteristics
constitute a case. In the VOX surveys, respondents were asked about each
specific project that was put to vote on the same day. Consequently, each
individual contributes as many cases to the stacked file as there were proposals
on the ballot on a given voting day (Kriesi 2005, p. 20). For the present
study, there were initially a total of 36,514 observations dispersed over 38
votes. Eliminating respondents who did not participate in the popular vote
and those who did not answer all personal questions reduces the sample to
18,815 observations.
The sample is further reduced to 14,989 observations by missing answers
to the motivation question and by ambiguous answers that did not allow
allocating a respondent to any group. This led to another problem: after in-
spection of descriptive data, we found that two of our votes of 1984 pertaining
to alternative energy sources and an exit from nuclear power were badly bi-
ased. Instead of having around 45% of respondents approving the measures,
we suddenly found our respondents approving the projects with almost 90%.
Unreliability in the early VOX surveys is known to be an often encountered
problem, especially with respect to the motivation questions. Thus, we de-
cided to discard these two votes which reduced the final sample size to 14,633
respondents for 36 votes.
6Due to missing data we were able to test only 36 of 38 projects in our model. See the
remarks below for further details.
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Voter typology using stated motives
The question in the VOX survey about voters’ motives for casting a ballot
in favor or against the proposal of the day has not yet been used extensively
for scientific research. It is the only open question in the survey, which might
explain some reluctance towards exploitation.7 We do not dispose of the
answers themselves but their recoding by the survey organizers, often just a
word or two. That prevents us from making all the distinctions we might
think of. Many voters cannot be allocated to any group because they did not
answer the motivation question or their answer was coded in an ambiguous
way.8 Additionally, attributing voters to groups was a difficult task as some
proposals pursued very narrow and issue-specific goals.
Table 3.2 shows how the voters were allocated to the motivation groups
outlined above. As indicated, we lost roughly 20% of our sample size due
to missing and incomplete data. The largest group is that of here-and-now
voters with 30% of the electorate, closely followed by the ideologues (28%)
and the anticipating voters (27%). The selfish voters represent only 11% of
the sample, but that might be related to our a priori that voters concerned
by high prices or employment loss worry not primarily for themselves and
are therefore classified as here-and-now voters. Anyway, adding them to the
motivation groups of here-and-now and anticipating voters, yields nearly 70%
of respondents who based their vote on considerations of costs and benefits of
the proposals.
Comparing voters who supported and opposed the environmental propos-
als shows clearly that more supporters are anticipating voters and more oppo-
nents are selfish voters. The other groups are about equally well represented
among supporters and opponents. Next we checked the personal composition
of the groups in terms of gender, education, linguistic region, urban/rural lo-
cation and political preferences. No category of voters was over-represented
in any of the groups.
Only education makes a small difference among those who did not answer
the motivation question or gave an answer that the interviewers could not
interpret: 6% of the voters with university education did not answer the moti-
7An exception is the study by Marquis (2004). He used the answers for a different
purpose, though, namely to relate citizens’ answers in the survey to the arguments voiced
by political parties and associations in political advertisements in Swiss newspapers.
8Kinder & Kiewiet (1981) experienced similar problems when coding open-ended ques-
tions in the American NES, e.g. aggregation of issues which do not belong together.
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Table 3.2: Distribution of respondents according to voter typology in absolute
numbers and percentage
Pro env. Contra env. Total
Ideologues 2,314 1,753 4,067
Selfish voters 511 1,088 1,599
Here-and-now voters 2,269 2,133 4,429
Anticipating voters 2,304 1,638 3,942
Cue-takers 248 348 596
7,673 6,960 14,633
Ideologues 30.2% 25.2% 27.8%
Selfish voters 6.7% 15.6% 10.9%
Here-and-now voters 29.9% 30.6% 30.3%
Anticipating voters 30.0% 23.5% 26.9%
Cue-takers 3.2% 5.0% 4.1%
100% 100% 100%
vation question and 14% gave an undeterminable motivation, against 11% in
each group at the other extreme, that of voters with only compulsory school
education. Leaving out respondents whose motivation answer cannot be used
from the sample for future analysis should not bias our results.
Voters with university education were less often allocated to the selfish
group (7% against 13% for voters with minimal education) and more often
to the ideology group (31% vs. 24%). There is no evidence that voters with
lower education more readily follow heuristic cues or shortcuts. As regards
gender and place of residence, there is no statistically significant difference in
the proportions of women and men allocated to each voter group or between
city and countryside dwellers, nor between inhabitants of the German, and
the French- and Italian-speaking cantons.
Finally, regarding political preferences, voters who place themselves on
the left belong more often to the anticipating voters and the ideologues (30%
each) than voters on the right (24% and 27% respectively). It is interesting
to note that left partisans seem to be the ones concerned most with problems
linked to environmental degradation in the future. Right partisans are a little
more often allocated to the here-and-now (33%) and the selfish voters (12%)
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than voters on the left (28% and 8% respectively); hence, leftist voters seem
to follow arguments for their own financial well-being less than voters on the
right when deciding on environmental projects. Voters in the centre and non-
partisans are in between.
3.4 The econometric model
Dependent and explanatory variables
The dependent variable is approval or rejection of proposals favorable to the
environment. All answers in the survey database were coded accordingly.
Most individual-level explanatory variables in the VOX database were contrast
coded (dummy variables) with 0 being the reference category. This is the case
for the variables ‘male’ (0=female), ‘urban’ (0=living in rural area), ‘car’
(0=owns no car) and ‘latin’ (1 if living in French- or Italian-speaking, 0 in
German-speaking part of the country). Education is an ordinal variable scaled
from 0 to 3 for compulsory school, apprenticeship, high school diploma, and
university degree. The corresponding value labels are ‘compulsory’ (reference
category), ‘apprentice’, ‘maturity’, ‘university’. The reference category for the
age-predictor is the group of the 18 to 29 year-olds, with the other groups
being 30-44, 45-59, and 60+.
The partisanship variable was based on two questions regarding party
identification and self-positioning on a left-right scale. The multiplicity of
political parties in Switzerland is reduced to three families: the conservative
right (Swiss People’s Party, Swiss Democrats and other parties of the radi-
cal right), the moderate right (Christian Democrats, Radicals, Liberals and
other small parties), and the left (Social Democrats, Greens, Workers Party
and other small left parties). The three names are accordingly ‘conservative’,
‘moderate’, ‘left’. Voters who do not identify with a party but position them-
selves clearly on one side of the left-right scale are added to the corresponding
category. We select the non-partisans as the reference category.
A general measure of economic conditions close to the voters’ interests is
the change in consumption climate from the preceding quarter (∆CC). The
indicator’s values were attributed to each voting weekend. It is based on a
consumer confidence survey held every three months in Switzerland among a
representative sample of 1,000 citizens who are asked general questions about
their consumption behavior in the near future and past (data from seco/State
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Secretariat for Economic Affairs). For a narrower measure of economic condi-
tions related to environmental policy, we use the price of gasoline, measured
as a yearly average and deflated by the consumer price index (‘gas price’).
Both variables were standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation of 1 to
facilitate comparison.9
The difficulty of decision-making on a specific proposal is measured through
a familiarity variable from the VOX database. Respondents were asked whether
they had found it rather hard or easy to make up their mind regarding the
proposals on the ballot. It is called ‘difficult’. The institutional setting of a
vote is represented by a dummy variable that defines votes where the elites
took a unanimous supportive stance towards the proposal (‘consensus’). This
was never the case for popular initiatives since they usually call for radical
solutions with the goal to put an issue on the agenda; in general these are
very seldom approved. In the time frame of this research only six out of 81
popular initiatives were accepted, three of those being included in our data
set. We also included a dummy variable for all votes pertaining to nuclear
power (‘nuclear’), since they evoke a very peculiar argumentative pattern in
the public debate and should play an important role for voters with a long-
term perspective on society.
Finally, according to the above description, the motivation groups are
called ‘selfish’, ‘here-and-now (HAN)’, ‘anticipating’, ‘ideologues’ and ‘cues’,
whereby the ideologues figure as the reference category.
A hierarchical model
Hierarchical models have been used only rarely to examine the impact of ge-
ographical and other contextual characteristics on individuals’ voting choices
(Jones, Johnston & Pattie 1992, Bühlmann 2006, Sciarini, Bornstein & Lanz
2007). For the present purpose, a two-level logistic random intercept model
is chosen so as to investigate processes operating at different levels at the
same time. The model suits our hypotheses best as we can test for variances
on the individual and contextual level as well as for cross-level interactions.
Thus, it allows testing the assumption that voters’ choices are influenced not
9Measuring the objective state of the economy via the lagged unemployment rate was not
possible due to Pearson’s correlation of r = 0.494 with the consumer confidence predictor;
likewise, the correlation for GDP and consumer confidence was r = −0.280 (values significant
at the 0.01-level, two-tailed test).
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only by their personal characteristics, but also by the context which they are
embedded in, which implies that errors are clustered and not independently
distributed (Steenbergen & Jones 2002).
Furthermore, we are able to overcome the problem of ecological fallacy
by modeling both the citizen and her context. Hence, instead of relying on
a pooled cross-sectional analysis we use the hierarchical structure where we
add time-series economic variables on level-2 to cross-section data on level-1.
Kramer (1983, p. 93) criticized earlier research on economic voting and the use
of cross-sectional individual-level data as being ‘ ... hopelessly contaminated.
It depends only tenuously on the true parameter value and in general is so
badly and unpredictably biased as to be essentially unrelated to the underlying
individual-level relationship we are trying to estimate’. We believe his position
to be somewhat extreme, especially in the light of his earlier work (Kramer
1971; for a further discussion, see Kinder, Adams & Gronke 1989). Thus, we
can overcome some of the most important problems linked to micro-level data
by incorporating macro-level data into the model simultaneously.
As the dependent variable in our multilevel model is discrete, either ap-
proval or refusal of environmental protection measures, we apply a logistic
hierarchical regression. The model has the following structure: the lower-level
consists of the individuals who are nested within the ballot proposals on level-
2. The formal representation of the model follows closely Snĳders & Boskers
(1999, pp. 207-226). Yij denotes support or refusal of an environmental pro-
posal by individual i on level-1 nested in level-2 context j. Predictor variables
are denoted by X1 to Xr taking values xhij (h = 1, ..., r).10 The logistic ran-
dom intercept model expresses the logit of Pij , the probability of supporting
the proposal, as the sum of a linear function of the explanatory variables and
a random deviation U0j that depends on level-2 context:
logit(Pij) = γ0 +
r∑
h=1
γhxhij + U0j (3.1)
The random deviations U0j are assumed to follow a Normal distribution
with zero mean and a variance of τ20 .
10The difference between level-1 and level-2 variables is irrelevant for parameter estima-
tion. Therefore, all variables on level-1 and level-2, including cross-level interactions, can be
represented mathematically as xhij (Snĳders & Bosker 1999, emphasis added).
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The hierarchical logistic regression can also be formulated as a threshold
model where the dichotomous outcome Y is then conceived as the result of
an underlying non-observed continuous variable. The underlying variable is
denoted by Y˘ . We state that Y is 1, if Y˘ is larger than the threshold, and 0,
if it is less than the threshold. As we are working with unobserved entities let
the threshold be 0. Thus, for the unobserved variable Y˘ we have a random
intercept model of the following form
Y˘ ij = γ0 +
r∑
h=1
γhxhij + U0j +Rij (3.2)
where the cumulative distribution function of the level-1 residual Rij is a
logistic function with mean 0 and variance of pi2/3 ≈ 3.29. By assuming that
Rij has this distribution, model (3.2) is equivalent to (3.1).11
All models were estimated with the multilevel software package MLwiN
2.02 using the Reweighted Iterative Generalised Least Squares (RIGLS) al-
gorithm, 2nd order PQL. Second-order penalized quasi-likelihood (PQL) es-
timates provide a considerable improvement over 1st order marginal quasi-
likelihood (MQL) estimates as the latter tend to be biased downwards (Rasbash,
Steele, Browne & Prosser 2004).
3.5 Results
Single-level model
The results for the single-level model confirm our hypothesis about the pos-
itive effects of higher education, urbanity and left partisanship. As can be
seen from Table 3.3, the direction of the signs and the statistical significance
of the coefficients confirm our assumptions. The left and green partisans and
those having attended university vote more strongly in favor of the proposals.
The positive effect for women implies that gender does have an impact on
green voting. We suspect that this could be linked to motherhood questions,
11Following Snĳders & Bosker (1999) we define a threshold model so as to be able to
calculate the proportion of explained variance using McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2MZ given by
R2MZ =
σ2F
σ2F + τ20 + σ2R
where σ2F is the variance of the linear predictor for Y , the intercept variance is var(U0j) =
τ20 , and σ2R has a logistic distribution (Snĳders & Bosker 1999, p. 225).
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whereby women might recognize more strongly the long-term impact of de-
pletion of resources with regards to our descendants. Urban dwellers, too,
have a higher probability of accepting the ballot propositions whereas those
possessing one (or several) private car(s) have a smaller probability of voting
yes. The predictor measuring people’s difficulty when making a choice is not
statistically significant though. In line with earlier studies, the age coefficients
have a negative sign, suggesting that the older voters are less supportive of
environmental policy (Thalmann 2004, Bornstein & Lanz 2007). Furthermore,
the probability of support for environmental policy in the French- and Italian-
speaking regions is lower than in the German part of the country, an effect
frequently observed in Swiss referendums (Kriesi 1999).
The single-level model in Table 3.3 also includes the motivation groups,
with the group of the ideologues serving as the reference category. We observe
that, compared to the ideologues, the probability that selfish voters and cue-
takers approve environmental proposals is weaker. The two groups represent-
ing sociotropic voting confirm our expectations partly: while voters reasoning
in short-term cost-benefit analyses are less likely to approve the proposals,
the coefficient does not attain statistical significance for the anticipating vot-
ers. We will comment in more detail on these effects when discussing the full
model below. However, it becomes clear that not all expectations formulated
in hypothesis 1 can be confirmed.
Adding the motivation group indicator into the vote equations is mainly
designed to better understand the consequences of belonging to those groups
rather than to raise the predictive power of the model. Indeed, in separate
tests not shown here, we found the proportion of explained variance to increase
only minimally upon introduction of the groups into the model. Remember
that each group comprises yes- and no-voters. There are only 32% of voters
in favor of the environment in the selfish group against 57% in the reference
group of the ideologues, and 58% in the group of the anticipating voters.
Thus, the clearly significant and very large negative coefficient for ‘selfish’
means that, when their personal characteristics are taken into account, voters
who weigh the benefits and costs of environmental proposals for themselves
tend to reject them more frequently than the ideologues. The same is true
for the here-and-now voters, but in lesser magnitude. The anticipating voters
then react more positively to the proposals, although the difference is not
statistically significant, a finding which is in line with the high percentage of
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yes-voters in that group. However, belonging to the cue-takers leads to voting
more often against the environment, which is most likely due to the lop-sided
elite configuration for a majority of the ballot propositions: all initiatives and
three referendums (N = 24) faced opposition by the national government,
major employers’ organizations and the three liberal-conservative government
parties. Furthermore, we know from the survey responses that most of the
cue-takers mentioned following the government’s or a party’s recommendation
when making a decision.
Two-level model
Adding level-2 contextual explanatory variables allows testing our hypotheses
on the economic and institutional effects on vote choice. The variables’ coef-
ficients confirm our a priories. The results are displayed in Table 3.3 as well.
While the coefficients of the individual determinants hardly change, we note
some mixed effects for the institutional and economic predictors.
First, we note that only the coefficient for the oldest voters attains sta-
tistical significance and is negative, indicating that when contextual effects of
the vote are accounted for, young and middle-aged voters are influenced less
by their age. Furthermore, more complex proposals diminish the probability
of voter approval, thus confirming earlier findings that projects which were
not understood by the electorate or comprehended with considerate difficul-
ties only faced a tough challenge at ballots (Zaller 1992, Sciarini, Bornstein &
Lanz 2007).
The two measures of current economic conditions, the change in consump-
tion climate and the deflated gasoline price, show mixed effects. As aforemen-
tioned, we were able to test neither for unemployment nor for GDP growth
since the two exhibited high correlations with our measure of current economic
conditions. Nevertheless, the effect of a higher gas price is clear-cut, namely it
lowers probability of approval. Our expectation that the citizenry is inclined
to vote in favor of the projects when they perceive the change in consumption
climate positively is also confirmed. A caveat applies though: for the selfish
voters this is not the case. This will be discussed below when interpreting the
cross-class interaction terms.
We note, finally, a positive effect for ballot propositions which gained unan-
imous support from the Swiss elites. Inversely, this implies that the left, which
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Table 3.3: Support for environmental proposals at Swiss ballots; hierar-
chical logistic regression†a
Single-level Two-level
Level-1 Level-2 Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
Constant 0.751** (0.090) 0.066 (0.168)
Age: 30-44 -0.098* (0.058) -0.039 (0.063)
Age: 45-59 -0.128* (0.059) -0.105 (0.065)
Age: 60+ -0.196** (0.060) -0.123* (0.067)
Apprentice 0.161** (0.055) 0.152** (0.060)
Maturity 0.301** (0.062) 0.310** (0.069)
University 0.431** (0.076) 0.560** (0.086)
Male -0.161** (0.037) -0.239** (0.040)
Urban 0.080* (0.037) 0.132** (0.041)
Latin -0.297** (0.043) -0.255** (0.047)
Left 0.905** (0.047) 1.065** (0.053)
Moderate -0.151** (0.045) -0.188** (0.050)
Conserv. -0.657** (0.064) -0.691** (0.071)
Difficult -0.042 (0.041) -0.128** (0.046)
Car -0.718** (0.050) -0.768** (0.055)
Selfish -0.942** (0.065) -1.051** (0.078)
HAN -0.157** (0.046) -0.288** (0.057)
Anticip. 0.055 (0.048) 0.297** (0.066)
Cues -0.602** (0.093) -0.492** (0.130)
∆CC 0.278** (0.112)
Gas price -0.236** (0.095)
Nuclear 0.348 (0.369)
Consensus 1.476** (0.212)
Selfish*∆CC -1.217** (0.066)
HAN*gas p. 0.065 (0.048)
Anticip.*nucl. 0.855** (0.160)
Cues*consens. -0.432** (0.203)
var(U0j) 0.314** (0.077)
corr. pred.b 64% 69%
R2MZ 0.15 0.28
† * p≤.05 ** p≤.01
a N = 14,633; extra-binomial distribution 1.009** (two-level model only)
b Cut value at 0.5
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in environmental referendums always opposed the established parties and or-
ganizations in the centre and on the right, has great troubles passing green
ballots if they do not receive support from the bourgeois parties, organized
business and employers organizations. Thus, all hypotheses pertaining to the
context level are confirmed. It remains to see how the determinants fare when
put in interaction with the separate motivation groups.
As mentioned above, group membership must be regarded less as an el-
ement to increase the predictive power of the model, but rather in terms of
discriminating what sort of considerations play a role for voters’ choice after
controlling for socio-structural characteristics. We note that the coefficients
from one equation to the next remain robust, but that there is improvement in
that the coefficient for the anticipating voters is now statistically significant.
Selfish voters, as expected in our hypotheses, have a greater probability of
rejecting the proposals. This is also true for the anticipating voters. In accor-
dance with our hypothesis, voters who are farsighted when making a decision
will rather approve of the environmental proposals. This effect is statistically
significant at the 1%-level, as are all effects for the motivation groups in the
full model. Finally, voters following cues, rather vote against the propos-
als, thus following the majority of the elites’ voting recommendations in our
case. Thus, expectations outlined in hypothesis 1 can be confirmed for the
full model whereas for the single-level model this is not the case. Finally, we
shall test the hypotheses pertaining to motivation groups put in interaction
with contextual determinants of the vote choice.
First, we test the pocketbook voting hypothesis by checking how the selfish
voters’ choice is influenced by the recent change in the consumption climate:
the group’s already impressively lower probability of accepting environmental
measures is further reduced. Thus, voters deciding about a proposal on the
basis of its impact on their personal financial situation are even more likely
to reject environmental proposals in times of improving consumer prospects.
This goes clearly against our assumptions of the beneficial effect of the change
in the consumption climate; we might want to interpret this effect as a prepon-
derance of material values, i.e. the increased availability of consumer goods
when pocketbooks are full, over immaterial environmental values. This finding
is supported by Halbheer, Niggli & Schmutzler (2006) who contend that vot-
ers, in their role as consumers, reject environmental proposals when it entails
a restriction of their consumer sovereignty.
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Next, we test the sociotropic hypothesis by creating an interaction effect
between the here-and-now voters and the gas price. The interaction effect does
not attain statistical significance suggesting that the burden of paying more for
gas is equally constraining to all voters. This finding has direct repercussions
on the above result, namely, in that voters, in their role as consumers, react
very sensitively to any kind of financial burden placed upon them (cf. Deacon
& Shapiro 1975). Thus self-interest seems to prevail for the pocketbook voters
and macro-economic changes are having effects across the entire electorate.
Closely linked to the post-materialist hypothesis, the dummy for nuclear
stands for the four initiatives requesting an exit from nuclear power (two in
1990; two in 2003). In each year, one of the two initiatives asked for a total
exit while the second, voted upon on the same weekend, asked for a ten-
year ban on further construction of nuclear power plants. The moratorium
was accepted in 1990 but not in 2003. This must be seen in the light of
two events: first, the catastrophe in Chernobyl just a few years earlier was
still present in people’s minds at the time of the first vote and raised fears
about further nuclear accidents. Second, fierce protests all over the country
in the 1980s orchestrated by a very well organized anti-nuclear movement
in Western Europe raised citizens’ awareness regarding the nuclear question
(Kriesi & Jegen 2001, Kitschelt 1986). However, the coefficient for ‘nuclear’
alone is not significant. But we expect anticipating voters to be particularly
sensitive to the preservation of a sound environment to their descendants and
to be concerned about nuclear power and waste storage. The positive sign of
the interaction effect confirms our expectations. Hence, while this group is
more likely to approve anti-nuclear initiatives this does not hold true for the
other groups as the nuclear-dummy is statistically insignificant.
Lastly, we test whether voters who indicated that they follow the gov-
ernment’s or their family and friends’ advice are particularly sensitive to the
institutional setting. It appears that the cue-takers’ support decreases in
mainstream situations, i.e. when elites back a proposal unanimously. This
result is surprising. We are led to believe that the Swiss system, grounded
in consociationalism, raises the possibility of a protest vote in times where
the elites tend towards a consensus-oriented position. In other words, these
voters might be dissatisfied with the bargaining in parliament which led to
a ‘lackluster compromise’ and therefore abstain from supporting this type of
coalition. Thus, in conclusion we must reject parts of hypothesis 3 as the self-
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ish voters did not react favorably to the increase in their consumer prospects
nor did the here-and-now voters react differently to the proposals compared
to the rest of the electorate.
3.6 Conclusion
The main purpose of this paper was to analyze economic determinants on
environmental voting and how they evolve over time. To this end, a rich deci-
sion making model for voters was built, leading to hypotheses about personal
and aggregate determinants of votes. We used citizens’ answers to a survey
question asking for their personal vote motive to create a typology of the elec-
torate. Building on the economic voting literature we were able to show that
citizens do reason in terms of personal costs and benefits, but that other ar-
guments such as preservation of natural habitats or economic competitiveness
are equally important.
The analysis started out with a single-level model of the kind frequently
used to test individual-level predictors of support for environmental protec-
tion measures (Kahn & Matsusaka 1997, Thalmann 2004). We found the usual
suspects to have the expected sign and to be statistically highly significant.
Thus, assumptions posited in the 1970s on the positive effect of voters’ higher
education, leftist political affinity and urbanity still hold true. It appears that
citizens in the German-speaking part of Switzerland are more environmentally
conscious than their French- and Italian-speaking compatriots, and that the
male breadwinner is less concerned with environmental protection. We con-
tend that citizens without a car support the proposals more than car owners
but leave it up to speculation whether this is due to an endogenous ‘environ-
mental conscience’ or rather financial and other exogenous considerations.
A multilevel random-intercepts model allowed testing for a variety of hy-
potheses pertaining to individual, institutional as well as economic time-series
effects on vote choice. We controlled for the institutional setting, more exactly,
the elites’ position regarding the ballot propositions and found that objects
which polarize the elites have a considerably lower chance of approval. This
holds true for all motivation groups with the exception of the cue-takers. For
them we suspect a certain reluctance to support a parliamentary compromise
which rallies all major elites in favor of the bill.
We obtain mixed results on the influence of micro- and macro-economic
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predictors on environmental vote choice. On the one hand, it holds true that
the change in the consumption climate has a direct influence on vote choice
implying that in times where voters feel more confident about their own con-
sumption they are inclined to vote in favor of environmental bills. Note though
that this effect does not apply to the selfish voters: we find that they are rather
more hostile to environmental policy and even reinforced in their disapproval
when in interaction with the change in consumption climate. We assume ma-
terial considerations to play a preponderant role for these voters. Moreover,
we get a clear indication that the willingness to pay for the environment de-
creases when the citizenry is touched by higher gas prices. Although Swiss
voters accepted a voluntary increase of the mean price of gas in 1993 in order
to subsidize road construction and maintenance, they reacted very sensitively
to market price fluctuations as shown by our analysis.
Notwithstanding a big number of studies focusing on the relationship be-
tween election outcomes and economic conditions, evidence on the impact of
evaluations of the economy on referendum votes is still scarce (cf. Bowler &
Donovan 1998). Anyhow, we assert that economic voting models can be ap-
plied very well to referendum elections and that they are thus beneficial to
the understanding of environmental voting behavior.
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4 Alliance Formation in the Pre-Parliamentary
Phase in Switzerland: Towards a Re-Configuration
of the Environmental Policy Space?
This chapter is a slightly modified version of a paper (Bornstein 2007), which
is accepted for publication pending revisions at the Journal of Public Policy.
Abstract
The present study analyzes the formation of alliances of corporate and
collective actors in the pre-parliamentary phase in Switzerland. Draw-
ing on data gathered in the so called consultation procedure, an expert
survey submitted to parties and interest associations, the paper tests
hypotheses pertaining to the alliance formation behavior of the actors
involved. As the environment, a typical New politics issue, has risen
on political agendas lately and is believed to cut across partisan lines, I
expect actors to engage in cross-cutting alliances. Responses were coded
on nine different items measuring actors’ degree of consent on the bills.
Multidimensional Scaling was employed so as to visually represent actors’
pre-parliamentary alliances. Results showed that the market vs. state
antagonism proves hard to overcome and that there is thus only limited
occurrence of cross-cutting alliances. Indeed, the environmental policy
space proves to be very stable due also to the consociationalist structure
of the Swiss polity.
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4.1 Introduction
Debates surrounding climate change and environmental protection are increas-
ingly gaining in salience in political discourse in advanced industrial democ-
racies. In April 2007, the UN Security Council devoted a day-long debate to
the impact of climate change emphasizing its economic, social and human-
itarian costs. However, policymaking in order to protect natural resources
and the habitat faces the obstacle of a trade-off between increased envi-
ronmental protection and economic performance. Thus, the conflict line in
environmental politics in advanced industrial democracies traditionally runs
between the interventionist-friendly Left and the Right defending the pri-
macy of economic growth and security (van Liere & Dunlap 1980, Sciarini
& Finger 1991). In Switzerland, this conflict line has, under the influence
of interest groups’ lobbying, obstructed effective ecological policy in the past
(Bornstein & Lanz 2007, Thalmann & Baranzini 2008). Hence, environmental
politics in Western democracies is often referred to as being structured by an
ecology vs. economy antagonism (Kriesi 1999, Jasper 1990), i.e. a distributive
conflict over the allocation of scarce resources.
Anyhow, Kitschelt (1994) contends that the left-right scheme of social-
ist electoral competition is gradually being replaced by a left-libertarian vs.
right-authoritarian conflict dimension due to the emergence of left-libertarian
parties, i.e. ecology parties, which oppose the primacy of economic growth,
defend new forms of political and labor market participation, and advocate
non-material goods such as personal freedom, gender equality, quality-of-life
issues and environmental protection (Inglehart & Flanagan 1987, Kitschelt
1994). Furthermore, higher education and rising levels of aﬄuence in ad-
vanced industrial democracies (Inglehart 1977), coupled with weakened party
ties (Dalton 2000), are thought to undermine the Old Left’s traditional axis
of electoral competition. In the wake of the Green parties’ electoral success
and direct competition with social democratic parties, parts of the Old Left
were forced to adopt essential left-libertarian claims such as the environment,
too (Kitschelt 1989). This shifting of electoral competition and the changing
of values over the last thirty years might also give rise to new alliances in
Swiss environmental policy between the left and parts of the moderate right
(Häusermann 2006, Kriesi & Jegen 2001).
Thus, this study pursues two goals: firstly, to analyze the respective al-
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liances corporate and collective actors engage in during the pre-parliamentary
phase, and secondly, to test the structure of the environmental policy space
with regards to the presumed left-right divide.
I analyze four pre-legislative drafts of bills which aimed at the introduction
of market-based instruments in environmental policy. To this end, I study
corporate and collective actors’ written responses given during the official
consultation procedure, i.e. in the pre-parliamentary phase, from 1990 to
2004.1 I make use of Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) in order to spatially
map actors’ positions on the pre-legislative drafts.
Following the introduction, Section 4.2 elaborates in more depth the ar-
gument of the a new conflict line in Swiss environmental policy. Section 4.2
reviews prior research on environmental policymaking and the institutional
setting in Switzerland. Section 4.3 presents the data and methods used. Re-
sults are presented and discussed in Section 4.4, whereas Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Changing conflict lines in environmental policy
In the past, environmental policy has been mostly driven by ecology parties
and the New Left in Western democracies, whereas the policy domain has not
figured prominently on conservative parties’ political agendas (Carter 2006,
van Liere & Dunlap 1980). The clear distinction between the pro-ecology
and the pro-economy camps might be undergoing changes, though (Kriesi &
Jegen 2001). Kitschelt (1994) showed that in European Social Democracy the
traditional distributional axis has been challenged by the advent of a conflict
line opposing authoritarian to libertarian values, which led to a shifting of the
main political competition along the left-libertarian vs. right-authoritarian
axis. The left-libertarian parties such as the ecology parties or other small
alternative movements (Kitschelt 1989) were at the heart of the new configu-
ration of electoral competition - developments, which were closely coupled to
value changes and the weakening of party ties in advanced industrial democ-
racies (Inglehart 1971, Flanagan 1982, Dalton 2000). It is now widely ac-
cepted that left-libertarian issues such as ethnic tolerance and gender politics
have risen to the top of political agendas of left parties, which was in part
1In Switzerland’s direct democratic system, an official consultation procedure of three
months permits all interested parties, organizations and citizens to express themselves on
the first legislative draft of a new law, which is usually prepared by an expert commission
and/or a Federal Office (Sciarini 2006, Papadopoulos 2001).
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due to the left-libertarians electoral success in social democracy (Inglehart &
Flanagan 1987, Kriesi 1999, Neumayer 2004). Hence, Kitschelt (1994) claims
that class conflicts no longer constitute the main foundation for electoral com-
petition. However, left-libertarians’ belief systems remain closer to socialist
ideas, whereas authoritarian parties defend the primacy of the market over re-
distributive resource allocation and are thus to be found closer to traditional
capitalist politics.2
Another reason for the emergence of left-libertarian parties in the 1970s
and 1980s must be seen in their frustration with capitalist politics’ empha-
sis on income growth and economic security which neglected the preserva-
tion of collective goods such as an intact natural environment. At the same
time, increasing levels of aﬄuence and education of post-World War II so-
cieties went hand in hand with the transition from a low skilled blue-collar
workforce to more highly educated white collar occupations (Kitschelt 1994).
Using data from the World Value Surveys, Flanagan & Lee (2003) demon-
strate the high correlations between environmental issues and left-libertarian
values: left-libertarians are more willing than authoritarians to accept taxes
to prevent pollution or to support pro-environment measures at the cost of
jobs.
Moreover, while prior research suggested that ‘beliefs about specific envi-
ronmental issues seem to fit together on a single dimension ... ’ (Pierce &
Lovrich 1980, pp. 260-261), i.e. on an ecological preservationist dimension,
scholars contend that in contemporary political competition the environment
cuts across the traditional left-right partisan alignment (Carter 2006). Hence,
new alliance patterns might be evolving which transcend the ‘old’ distribu-
tional dimension. It is reasonable to assume that the environmental issue now
figures prominently on the political agenda of liberal-conservative parties as
programmatic national partisan differences in environmental policy are fad-
ing in the light of new global environmental challenges such as anthropogenic
climate change. Nowadays, science acknowledges that anthropogenic influ-
ence on climate change due to increasing Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions
has become one of the most salient environmental issues in the past decades
(Kolstad & Toman 2005, IPCC 2007). Therefore, parties failing to absorb
the environment into their political agenda may be seriously at risk as voters
2I agree with Finger & Hug (1992, p. 290) that libertarians need not by definition be
left (Kitschelt 1988, p. 197).
4.2. Changing conflict lines in environmental policy 69
might shift their partisan loyalties (Carter 2006). It should therefore prove in-
creasingly difficult for liberal-conservative parties not to respond to demands
of the electorate concerning the protection of natural resources.3
Finally, in early environmental policymaking direct regulation was pre-
ferred over taxes since it was believed that short-term gains for the regulated
industry prevailed (Buchanan & Tullock 1975). However, the economic in-
struments propagated as of the late 1980s provided for a mechanism which
in theory assured cost-neutrality to administration and avoided redistributive
politics - arguments considered crucial for the acceptance by bourgeois parties
(Felder & Schleiniger 2002, Schneider & Volkert 1999).
Institutional framework in Switzerland
While there is a scarce but growing literature on referendums in Swiss environ-
mental politics (Halbheer, Niggli & Schmutzler 2006, Bornstein & Thalmann
2007, Sciarini, Bornstein & Lanz 2007, Thalmann 2004, Bornstein & Lanz
2007), there are to date only few studies analyzing coalitional patterns in the
environmental policy domain (e.g. Thalmann 1997). Recently, two studies an-
alyzed the elaboration of the Swiss CO2-law. Thalmann & Baranzini (2008)
opted for a descriptive-analytical approach, which highlighted the pressure
group politics employed by business during the making of the CO2-law. Ingold
(2007) relies on expert interviews so as to reconstruct the actor configuration
during the elaboration of the CO2-law with Social Network Analysis.
Likewise, Kriesi & Jegen (2001) studied the actor configuration in the
Swiss energy domain with expert interviews. They start from the assumption
that the policy field is dominated by two camps, namely the ‘pro-growth’
vs. ‘pro-ecology’ coalitions, but that new coalitional patterns evolve which
transcend the bipolar configuration. They conclude that: ‘Some key members
of the parliamentary committees in the energy policy domain representing
parties from the center-right, parties which are typically part of the pro-growth
coalition, have joined the pro-ecology coalition. ... New forms of alliances have
taken shape as a result’ (Kriesi & Jegen 2001, p. 284). Thus, the left-right
cleavage in energy policy seems to be weakening.
Yet, despite the above evidence the left-right divide proves to be extremely
3This point is crucial considering that the Radicals (PRD) recently drafted a position
paper on abatement and mitigation measures in climate policy; the same party which fought
ferociously against a CO2-tax in parliament (see NZZ 02.07.2007, p. 7).
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powerful in environmental politics. This goes back to the days of the formation
of green and alternative parties out of social movements and grassroots ecolog-
ical movements in the late 1970s and their subsequent reinforcing of the tradi-
tional Left’s bargaining power (Kriesi & Jegen 2001, Ladner 1989, Hug 1990).
Corroborating this claim for Switzerland, Sciarini & Finger (1991) showed
that the Social Democrats (PSS) and the Greens exhibit very similar values
on a left-right self-declaration scale and that their positions basically unite
on an ecology-economy axis (see the appendix for abbreviations).4 Likewise,
Neumayer (2004), using data from the Manifesto Research Group, was able to
show that traditional left-wing and left-libertarian parties in Western societies
indeed are more supportive of green policy. In addition, analyses of environ-
mental voting behavior in Switzerland corroborated the significant and large
positive effect of left and green partisanship on citizens’ vote choice (Bornstein
& Lanz 2007, Sciarini, Bornstein & Lanz 2007, Thalmann 2004).
The picture in parliament seems to be quite similar. Schwarz (2006) stud-
ies roll-call votes in the National Council, the lower chamber of parliament,
from 1996 to 2005. He is able to show that the left-right axis remains the
decisive conflict line. The coalition on the left of the Greens and the So-
cial Democrats (PSS) is the most homogenous uniting in almost 90% of all
roll-call votes. Though, when it comes to environmental issues the Christian-
Democrats (PDC) join the left-green coalition in almost 50% of the cases,
whereas the Radicals (PRD) and the Swiss People’s Party (UDC) in turn
unite in nearly 70% of green votes (see also Kriesi 2001). Hence, empirical ev-
idence points to a rather marked ideological conflict in parliamentarians’ and
citizens’ voting behavior. Note, however, that Kriesi (2001), Kriesi & Jegen
(2001) and Häusermann (2006) found considerable divergence in the camp of
the bourgeois actors regarding energy policy and modernizing social policy,
respectively.
Finally, outside the parliamentary arena, interest groups, labor unions and
employers associations usually ally with established parties to obtain desired
policy outcomes. Kriesi (2001) remarks that the ‘double loyalties’ of members
of parliament towards the party and the interest associations they adhere to
are equally strong (cf. Linder 2006, Mach 2006). Thus, it follows that in the
4Thus, these findings run counter to Kitschelt’s (1994, p. 290) observation that the PSS
does not advocate left-libertarian values; on the contrary, the PSS integrated New Politics
issues such as the environment in their political agenda as of the late 1980s (Kreuzer 1990,
Sciarini & Finger 1991, Finger & Hug 1992).
4.3. Data and methods 71
Swiss polity, organizational interests are tied very closely to party politics.
Scharpf’s (1997) game-theoretic, Rational Choice approach to public policy
states that actors are constantly under institutional constraints which guide
their choice to a certain extent. I follow his concept, in that I conceive actors
as being collective and corporate actors such as political parties, labor unions,
government ministries etc. rather than individuals. All in all, around 40 of
the most important actors in Swiss environmental politics will be taken into
account.
Hypotheses
Summarizing, I test whether the structure of the environmental policy space.
Actors are believed to position themselves vis-à-vis the proposals with regards
to the market logic and the ecological dimension, i.e. the nine items coded for
every issue (see following Section). As a consequence thereof, cross-cutting
alliances in environmental policy might become more feasible.
H1 If it holds true that the Old Left adopted new politics issues due to the
rise of the ecology party, the Old and New Left parties should be form-
ing alliances with each other and with the trade unions and ecological
movements.
H2 If it holds true that the environment is a cross-cutting issue and that
economic instruments garner approval by bourgeois actors more easily,
cross-cutting alliances between the bourgeois parties and employers with
parts of the left will be formed.
Anyhow, if we are able to observe changes in environmental political com-
petition, do they represent a new stable alliance pattern or are they due to
issue-specific reforms only? I test the above assumptions and present results
thereof in Section 4.4. But first I provide some brief information on data and
methods in the following Section.
4.3 Data and methods
Case selection
As the aim of this paper is to study the formation of alliances in environmen-
tal policy, cases were chosen which represent not only issues which are high
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Table 4.1: The six reform issues under study
Year Code Reform issue
1990 LPE1.1 Principle of introducing incentive taxes
LPE1.2 Incentive taxes on VOCs, heating oil and Diesel
containing more than 0.1% of Sulfur, and fertil-
izers
1994 LCO1 Stabilization of CO2-emissions
1996 LCO2.1 Voluntary agreements to reduce CO2-emissions
LCO2.2 Incentive tax on fossil fuels
2004 LCO3 V3 - Climate penny on motor fuels and sub-
sidiary incentive tax on heating oil
on political agendas in Western societies, i.e. emissions reductions, but also
such which use economic instruments in environmental policymaking. Fur-
thermore, data availability was evidently the second criteria for case selection.
Unfortunately, it was impossible to go back further in time to be able to assess
the formation of alliances for a longer time frame since data was unavailable
to come by. Furthermore, as the four reforms pursue a very similar goal, it
is a most similar cases design which facilitates comparison across issues and
time.
The data in the analysis stems from four consultation procedures pertain-
ing to the Law on the Protection of the Environment (LPE) and the CO2-Law
(LCO). Four consultation procedures on the policy packages took place be-
tween 1990 and 2004. Two policy packages contained two issues while the
other two only consisted of one issue. I thus studied six reform issues; the
issues are listed in Table 4.1. The pre-legislative drafts aimed at introduc-
ing market-based instruments to mitigate emissions of pollutants (see also
Thalmann & Baranzini 2008, Ingold 2007). Three out of the four packages
were subject to an optional referendum, whereas the last package in 2004
addressed the enforcement of the CO2-law and was not subject to a referen-
dum. In the following, I will briefly comment on the policy packages; the full
description of each package is given in the appendix.
The Revision of the Federal Bill on the Protection of the Environment
(LPE1) in 1990 became necessary, firstly, in order to conduct major revisions
on regulation regarding environmentally damaging activities and pollutants,
and secondly, so as to integrate market-based instruments into the law. The
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Federal Bill on a CO2-Tax (LCO1) in 1994 was the first of three consultation
procedures pertaining to the CO2-law. The bill aimed at stabilizing CO2-
emissions by introducing incentive taxes on fossil energy sources and partially
earmarking the revenues for energy-efficiency measures. The Federal Bill on
the Reduction of CO2-Emissions (LCO2) of 1996 was a revised version of the
pre-legislative draft of 1994. It relied on Voluntary Agreements (VAs) between
the industry and government in order to lower CO2-emissions by 10% of 1990
levels by 2010. An incentive tax on fuels and heating oil was only envisioned as
a subsidiary measure should targets be missed. Revenues were to be restituted
completely to the economy and the population. In the Consultation Procedure
on the Measures regarding Compliance with the CO2-Law (LCO3) in 2004, four
different measures (V1 - V4) were proposed by public administration to fulfill
the obligations of the CO2-law. The present analysis pertains to V3, which was
later implemented. It propagated VAs between the economy and government,
the so called climate penny on gasoline, and only foresaw an incentive tax on
heating oil if reduction targets were at risk. Revenues from the climate penny
were to be earmarked for emissions abatement in Switzerland and abroad
while those from a tax were to be fully redistributed.
The data used in this paper stems from the actors’ written responses to
the bills submitted to consultation. For each policy package 30-40 actors were
retained. Each bill was coded regarding nine different items. I assign the value
of 1 when the actor claimed a stricter proposal, 0 when the actor supported
the measure as proposed, and -1 when the actor claimed a smaller or more
voluntary agreement. For every reform issue a separate coding template was
prepared in order to account for the drafts’ different designs. However, it was
not always possible to code a position on all nine items due to an item missing
in the bill. This was the case for one of the issues in 1990, on the principle of
introducing incentive taxes (without Exemption, Gradualism, Level), and on
one of the issues in 1996, namely the possibility of concluding VAs (without
Gradualism, Revenue recycling). The nine items are the following:
Intervention / Timing: Is there an environmental problem which demands
federal state intervention. If so, when?
Instrument: How should state intervene: VAs, command-and-control regula-
tion or taxes?
Scope sector : Which sectors should be covered?
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Scope pollution: Which damaging liquids or gases should be covered?
Level: Should the level of the incentive tax / emissions reduction be higher or
lower?
Gradualism: Should the incentive tax / emissions reduction be gradually in-
creased?
Revenue recycling: Should revenues be (partially) earmarked or redistributed?
Neutrality: Should measures be neutral with regards to public spending ratio?
Exemption: Should energy-intensive companies be exempted from the tax?
Multidimensional Scaling
I analyze the data with Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) in Stata 9.2 in order
to visualize actors’ proximities in space based on their responses to the nine
items. MDS aims at uncovering the hidden structure in the data, such that
the distances between points match the dissimilarities in terms of their policy
preference. In other words, the larger the dissimilarity between the actors’
positions the further apart they should be in the spatial map (Kruskal &
Wish 1978). As MDS has some similarities with Factor Analysis/Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) both methods were tested. Results from PCA
were largely identical in that results showed that two dimensions accounted for
most of the part of the variance explained. However, as visual representation
of the results from MDS is simpler to interpret, I showed results from MDS
only.
The graphs should be read as follows: the distances between the actors
represent the similarity of their policy preference as coded in the responses
to the consultation procedure. Those actors being close together thus form
an issue alliance. I highlighted the alliances with ellipses for greater clarity.
Table 4.2 gives information on the number of actors for each reform issue and
the Kruskal’s Stress coefficient, which measures the badness of fit. A lower
value implies a better fit of the model. From Table 4.2 we can observe that
the Stress statistic ranges between 0.12 and 0.2, which implies that the fit is
good for all issues analyzed (Mead 1992). In classical MDS distances between
points are treated as Euclidean distances. This yields dissimilarity δrs between
rth and sth objects where a dissimilarity of an object with itself is zero, i.e.
δrr = 0 (Cox & Cox 2001, p. 9).
All actors were included in the models. In order to allow for greater clarity
the smaller and less influential actors were not included in the plots, given that
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Table 4.2: Kruskal’s Stress statistic for all reform issues
Reform issue N Kruskal’s Stress
LPE1.1 31 0.1235
LPE1.2 31 0.1452
LCO1 38 0.1621
LCO2.1 38 0.1526
LCO2.2 38 0.2093
LCO3 33 0.1638
both their weight in the policymaking process and their veto player capacities
are rather small (Hug & Tsebelis 2002). This is especially the case for the
many small environmental groups who lack resources and usually refrain from
formulating a consultation response using instead the consultation answer
drafted by larger organizations such as the WWF. The same applies to smaller
energy and sectoral employers organizations. Papadopoulos (2001, p. 42)
argues that the greater an actor’s referendum power, the more consideration
is usually given to his suggestions formulated in the consultation procedure.
4.4 Results
In the following the results from MDS pertaining to the formation of political
alliances during the pre-parliamentary phase are presented.
The revision of the LPE in 1990 encountered opposition mainly due to its
attempt at introducing incentive taxes, whereas all the other amendments to
the law passed more or less uncontested. The results are plotted in Figure 4.1
and show that opposition to the first reform issue, on the principle of incentive
taxes in ecological policy, came from the bourgeois and conservative parties,
and major business and employers organizations. They requested more vol-
untary agreements between the economy and the federal administration, or
other economic instruments such as emissions trading, which were perceived
to exert less strain on the economy. On the other hand, the PSS, the Greens
and trade unions embraced the instrument as a complement to direct regu-
lation, but wished for partial or full earmarking of revenues from a potential
tax. Hence, a distributional left-right split manifested itself on the principle
of introducing incentive taxes in ecological policy.
Nevertheless, on the second issue of the policy package, actor constellations
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Figure 4.1: Multidimensional Scaling of actors’ positions on the ‘Principle of
introducing incentive taxes’ in 1990
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Figure 4.2: Multidimensional Scaling of actors’ positions on ‘Incentive taxes
on VOCs, heating oil and Diesel containing more than 0.1% of Sulfur, and
fertilizers’ in 1990
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were no longer split along the distributive divide (see Figure 4.2). A mixed
alliance of bourgeois parties united with the ecologically aware sectoral em-
ployers organizations and labor unions to form a third block between the two
poles.5 The cross-cutting alliance encompassed actors usually not favorable
to pro-ecology demands such as the PRD and the TCS, for whom cost- and
budget-neutrality, respectively, favorable conditions for private mobility, are
crucial. However, as we will see below, this issue did not touch their interests
directly. The trade unions reacted reluctantly to the issues or even regarded
them as being superfluous and refrained from supporting the Left. Hence, the
Left camp was split as to whether and how to introduce incentive taxes on
these pollutants since marginal abatement costs seemed too high with respect
to the stipulated reduction targets.
Following the consultation procedure, the Federal Council introduced in-
centive taxes on VOCs, and heating oil and Diesel containing more than 0.1%
of Sulfur. The bill foresaw full redistribution of revenues to the population
and firms. The tax basically had no consequences since the revision of the
regulation on air quality in 1993 aimed at a lowering of Sulfur in Diesel and
heating oil to 0.05%. A measure which the oil-importing industry, the bour-
geois parties as well as private traffic organizations had agreed to. This meant
that basically no economic contraction could be expected for the sectors in
question. Furthermore, under the strong pressure of the farmers’ lobbies the
tax on fertilizers was abandoned; however, the Federal Council received the
legal competence to implement an incentive tax on fertilizers should it deem
fit.
Nevertheless, in the message accompanying the law’s final draft delivered
to parliament on June 7, 1993, the FC undertook a rather positive assessment
of the consultation procedure, stating that a very big number of actors wished
to introduce economic instruments as a complement to direct regulation but
that divergence remains almost only over the question of the use of revenues
(Conseil Fédéral 1993, p. 1411-15). This is only partly true, since a rather
large number of consulted actors claimed that it is too early to conceive of
incentive taxes as complementary instrument to direct regulation in ecological
policy (see also the large negative value for the item ‘Intervention / Timing’
5ÖBU and the SSIC must be regarded as ‘brokers’ in the business camp in favor of a
progressive climate policy forced to manage the split between a business-oriented approach
which at the same time does not neglect environmental concerns (cf. Ingold 2007).
78 Alliance Formation in the Pre-Parliamentary Phase
WWF
Greens
PLS
UP
PRD
SSIC
UDC
ASTAG
ÖBU
USS
economiesuisse
TCS
USAM
PDC
travail.suisse
USP
PSS
0
1
2
3
0
0
Figure 4.3: Multidimensional Scaling of actors’ positions on the ‘Stabilization
of CO2-emissions’ in 1994
in Table 4.3).
The Revision of the LPE was adopted in parliament in 1995, but by 1994
government had submitted a new bill into consultation pertaining to incen-
tive taxes on fossil fuels. This strategy offered the bourgeois and conservative
actors the possibility to attack the constitutionality of the 1994 project. As
shown in Figure 4.3 they formed a grand alliance against the bill. Aside the
constitutional argument, the points of contention regarded the earmarking
of revenues for energy-efficieny measures, the disproportional restitution of
revenues to the population, and the competitive disadvantages Swiss com-
panies would face when doing business with Europe, since the majority of
EU-countries had not yet introduced comparable legislation. The bourgeois
bloc’s opposition to a Swiss Alleingang (unilateral solution) and, in conse-
quence, the referendum threat loomed as an ever-present veto point over the
legislator. Indeed, the TCS openly threatened government in the concluding
section of its consultation reply of September 22, 1994: ‘Should parliament
approve the Federal Council’s CO2-proposal, then the TCS would be forced
to launch a referendum’.
The alliance in the political center of SSIC, PDC and ÖBU would be
rather powerless did it not ally with its traditional partners further to the
right. The moderate actors supported the draft’s general provisions, but were
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against the earmarking of revenues. But the conservative Right isolated the
political center since the grand alliance of employers, road traffic organizations
and conservative parties took an opposite position on the draft, since they
rebuked any incentive tax. The PDC took a somewhat ambivalent position as
they opposed earmarking for domestic energy-efficiency measures but not for
such obtained in Eastern Europe. The green-left alliance fully supported the
government’s project as the partial earmarking of revenues would be used to
mitigate damages from pollution, whereas the trade unions favored the draft
since they anticipated a gradual transfer of social insurance contributions from
labor to energy. However, the heavy refusal of the project by the majoritarian
politico-economic milieux, coupled with the referendum threat, coerced the
administration to modify the bill and re-submit it to consultation in 1996.
The revised draft provided for Voluntary Agreements (VAs) and a tax
only if VAs proved insufficient. All revenues of the potential tax would be
redistributed to the population and the firms. Due to the law’s non-binding
character and the delegation of power to parliament to decide on the level
of the tax, political consensus among the bourgeois and conservative actors
was easily obtained, as shown in Figure 4.4. VAs offered business a little con-
straining tactic to circumvent a tax (Baranzini, Thalmann & Gonseth 2004).
However, this amounted to a typical situation where government achieved
the desired result by providing greater flexibility to the industry (Bernauer &
Caduff 2004, Daley 2007) to the detriment of a stringent CO2-policy. The con-
servative Right signaled opposition even to VAs doubting the necessity of any
additional legislative activity regarding mitigation of CO2-emissions, whereas
the Left took a stand against VAs for the opposite reasons: they doubted that
reduction targets could be obtained with VAs.
The second issue in the policy package, the subsidiary incentive tax raised
more differentiated concerns (Figure 4.5). The conservatives, the bourgeois
actors and the employers organizations had been consulted during the elabora-
tion of the draft, which garnered their approval of VAs but not of the incentive
tax. This was somewhat surprising, since the tax design was cost-neutral since
it abstained from earmarking of revenues and had no negative competition ef-
fects on external trade. However, for the farmers, the PDC and the trade
unions this would suffice - they signaled general agreement of the draft and
thus a small cross-class alliance took shape. Yet, this alliance remained with-
out consequences as the government submitted the project nearly unchanged
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Figure 4.6: Multidimensional Scaling of actors’ positions on the ‘Climate
penny on fuel and subsidiary incentive tax on heating oil (V3)’ in 2004
into parliament and therefore an incentive tax would enter into force only as ul-
tima ratio (cf. Thalmann & Baranzini 2008). Against this powerful bourgeois
alliance the Left’s demand of a higher tax level and earmarking of revenues
form emissions abatement remained unheard.
Finally, in 2004, the FC submitted four alternatives (V1 - V4) to consul-
tation to comply with the emissions reductions target set in the CO2-law. An
overwhelming majority of bourgeois and conservative actors favored V3 and
V4, whereas the Left favored V1, which foresaw a mandatory incentive tax on
CO2-emissions. V3 envisioned the so called climate penny and a subsidiary
incentive tax, whereas V4 relied on the climate penny only. Figure 4.6 shows
that a left-right divide ensued. However, some actors’ behavior was strik-
ingly inconsistent. This applies especially to the PDC who reverted back to
the conservative camp and in the aftermath to the consultation, obstructed
the law’s implementation in parliament (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, November 9,
2005, p. 11). But also employers, traffic organizations and the oil-processing
industry, who had supported the 1996 project with the subsidiary tax, now
asked for the climate penny only (V4). They but half-heartedly supported V3
as a ‘worst-case’ scenario. Should V3 enter into force they hoped that parlia-
ment would adopt a low tax rate in case a tax became necessary (Thalmann
& Baranzini 2008). Yet, the economy was not unified either. While orga-
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nized business, under the leadership of economiesuisse, were clearly against
a CO2-tax, SSIC and ÖBU were in favor of the tax since companies, which
had already concluded VAs with government would be exempted from the
tax. Thus, would the tax not enter into force, firms would not be able to
capitalize on their pre-calculated gains. Hence, the Left allied with ecology-
friendly employers organizations so as to demand for stringent enforcement of
the CO2-law but were defeated by the larger liberal-conservative alliance.
Discussion
The proposals in 1990 and 1994 evoked rather clear reactions along the dis-
tributive dimension. Subsequently, bourgeois and conservative actors pres-
sured administration to change the bill’s paragraphs in question and to al-
low for VAs. The policy adjustment by government showed that the de-
sign of climate policy is heavily subject to organized business’ rent-seeking
(Pashigian 1985, Bernauer & Caduff 2004). Furthermore, mitigation of pollu-
tants is feasible if, and only if, reductions targets are not set too ambitiously
and full restitution of revenues is provided; however, this proved not sufficient
in 2004.
This finding is further underlined by Table 4.3, where deviations from
zero of each of the nine items is shown. As 0 stands for agreement on the
bill, negative values accordingly imply an actor’s demand for more laxity of
the bill. Although the six issues are pooled over 14 years, this does not pose
a problem since, in separate analyses not shown here, the results for every
single issue is largely the same as it is when pooled over time. It is shown
that the choice of the instrument and the moment of intervention (first two
items) were items which provoked meaningful reactions by all actors involved.
However, the most contentious items were clearly those relating to the use of
the revenues and the design of the bills regarding economic competitiveness
(last three items). This confirms the claim, that the majority of the actors
involved in environmental policymaking, were mostly concerned about the
bills’ impacts on trade and competition.
Thus, when in 1996 public administration invited the economic milieux
to partake in the preparation of the pre-legislative draft, it relied, in conse-
quence, heavily on voluntary measures. In 2004, however, the incentive tax
stood not the slightest chance against the oil industry’s climate penny. This
again underlines the stronghold of interest groups on policymaking when the
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Table 4.3: Mean values for the nine dimensions pooled over all reform issues
Dimension N Mean
Intervention/Timing 209 -0.182
Instrument 209 -0.220
Scope sector 209 0.053
Scope pollution 209 -0.033
Level 178 0.017
Gradualism 140 0.028
Revenue recycling 171 -0.310
Neutrality 209 -0.282
Exemption 178 -0.169
policy has tangible effects on the fuel economy (Stigler 1971, Kirchgässner &
Schneider 2003). Finally, in the parliamentary arena, the market vs. state
forces fought a harsh battle in 2005 and 2006 on the implementation of an
incentive tax on heating oil, which became compulsory according to the CO2-
law. After lengthy parliamentary debates and concessions by government,
parliament decided on March 20, 2007 to introduce the tax as of January 1,
2008.6
There is limited evidence of cross-cutting alliances on some reform issues,
but this seems to be the case only for measures where administration and bour-
geois actors had either bargained an agreement beforehand or where tax levels
were set so low that no economic contraction could be expected. However, the
main conflict revolves around a capitalist-socialist politics dimension. Hence,
political competition in Swiss environmental policy is shaped by a left-right
configuration where, akin to Sciarini & Finger’s (1991) findings some twenty
years ago, the authors showed that the environmental issue was integrated into
the left-right dimension rather than the latter being cross-cut by a new ‘eco-
logical’ conflict line (see also Finger & Hug 1992). They argued that this was
most likely not going to change since the Greens’ position on social, economic
and environmental issues points to a marked left-right cleavage.7
Thus, the first hypothesis is confirmed since in the objects under study,
6See the parliament’s website for further information
http://www.parlament.ch/f/do-co2-umsetzung (retrieved on July 11, 2007)
7Furthermore, in separate analyses not shown here, I undertook Factor Analysis of par-
ties’ voting recommendations on environmental issues (1990-2004). The results showed that
the PSS and the Greens load on the same dimension. And lastly, spatial mapping of party
positions by Hug & Schulz (2007) underline this finding.
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the left and the green actors formed a unified camp which in most of the issues
opposed the conservative and bourgeois actors. However H2 is not verified,
except for two cases. But as I argued above, the cross-cutting alliances were
rather an issue-specific phenomenon and do not point to a new stable pattern
of alliance formation. Hence, traditional conflict lines in Swiss environmental
policy might remain unchanged due to large center and right-wing party shares
in parliament, and extra-parliamentary alliances with regulated industries.
These factors help foster a polity where liberal market forces and associated
interest groups often get their way against a minoritarian Left (Mach 2006).
Indeed, while the Left’s capacity to mobilize is rather high due to alliances
with movements on the far left, their ability to overturn policy where stakes
are high to business and its interest groups is restrained. Consequently, the
veto power capacities of collective and corporate actors in the political center
and on the right (Scharpf 1997, Linder 2006) delegates the government’s role
towards a simple mediator watching over checks and balances in the Swiss
direct democratic system (Trechsel & Sciarini 1998). This sort of policy ad-
justment by government to the demands of a strong politico-economic camp
is all but unusual for Switzerland.
4.5 Conclusion
The goal of this study was to test hypotheses pertaining to the formation of
cross-cutting alliances in environmental policy. To this end, I analyzed four
policy packages aiming at introducing incentive taxes into current law between
1990 and 2004. Based partly on research pertaining to a re-structuring of
electoral competition in advanced industrial democracies, I set up hypotheses
regarding the alliance formation behavior of corporate and collective actors. I
claimed that the growing salience of environmental and climate change issues
at the outset of the 21st century should force traditional bourgeois actors to
embrace these issues more consequently in their political agendas and thus
make cross-cutting alliances more feasible. And lastly, the increased use of
economic instruments should make ecological policy more acceptable to these
actors. Thus, the capital-labor divide should be weakened as actors would
engage in cross-cutting alliances.
Using Multidimensional Scaling, I was able to uncover the underlying con-
flict dimensions in Swiss environmental policy. The analyses show that the
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main political conflict stems from the distributive axis, with its inextrica-
ble link to economic competitiveness and unregulated markets. Although
value changes have undoubtedly taken place in Switzerland too, making room
for post-materialist issues such as the environment, gender equality or new
social needs (Häusermann 2006), there is only limited evidence of a cross-
cutting alliances in Swiss environmental politics. Bargaining of organized
business, political parties and other interest associations with government be-
fore and during the pre-parliamentary phase led to a compromise acceptable
to the regulated industries - to the detriment of a stringent CO2-policy (e.g.
Pashigian 1985, Daley 2007, Thalmann & Baranzini 2008).
Thus, at the heart of my analysis two facts can be stated: firstly, and
foremost, the capacity of left and green actors to broker overarching alliances
with bourgeois actors remains constrained, and secondly, the question of rev-
enue use remains primordial to the design of green taxes. Thus, at the in-
ternational level, these considerations from the Swiss experience must be
taken into account too, when regulators attempt at introducing mitigation
and abatement measures at the national or sub-national level (e.g. Daugbjerg
& Pedersen 2004, Hammar & Jagers 2007).
Anyhow, the left-right divide in environmental policy might be changing
in times to come as adverse effects of pollution such as climate change are
being felt and discussed more intensely. Heightened media coverage and more
frequent occurrence of natural disasters might further spur society’s awareness
of environmental degradation. These developments - albeit to the detriment
of our habitat - might help in overcoming traditional conflict lines in envi-
ronmental politics. Slowly but surely a change of paradigms can be observed
in Switzerland, for example by the founding of a new ‘Greenliberal Party’.
Indeed, the party actively advocates a coexistence of a liberal belief system
with environmental protection by implementing economic instruments instead
of direct regulation. Thus, electoral competition might finally adapt to the
salience of the environmental issue, even if the latter is characterized by un-
certainty and distributional effects. For, awareness amongst Western publics
is growing that humans are in part responsible for environmental problems
and that consequences - for the environment, society and economy - may be-
come very costly if nothing is done (McKibbin & Wilcoxen 2002, Kolstad &
Toman 2005, IPCC 2007). Hence, it is not yet too late for the greening of
political competition and the economy.
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5 Conclusion
The starting point for my research was twofold: on the one hand I analyzed
voting behavior on environmental issues and citizens’ demand for the pub-
lic good environment, on the other hand I focused on corporate and col-
lective actors’ rent-seeking and alliance formation behavior during the pre-
parliamentary phase in Switzerland. Guiding this research was the underlying
assumption of a divide between the willingness to enforce natural resources
protection and the costs imposed by such policies. Each of the thesis’ three
constituting Chapters analyzed ecological policymaking from a different per-
spective, however, all three put their emphasis on the acceptability of green
policy either by the people or by collective actors such as interest groups and
political parties.
The research project, from which this thesis partly originated, was con-
cerned with citizens’ opinion formation processes regarding votes on environ-
mental issues. Based on prior research by Philippe Thalmann and Pascal
Sciarini on referendum voting, opinion formation, and the acceptability of en-
vironmental policy, this thesis seeks to further shed light on these processes
in direct democracy. While part of the research concentrated on John Za-
ller’s opinion formation model, the three contributions to this thesis adopted
a more rational choice approach to policymaking. However, we proposed a
rational choice model in Chapter 2 expanded by the notion of the logic of
appropriateness, while in Chapter 3 different variants of the self-interested
voter theorem were developed. Chapter 4 showed that a majority of collective
actors favors policy which maximizes short-term benefits and avoids costs in
the short run for voters and organized business. Thus, I conceive of principals
as well as agents undergoing a trade-off between costs and benefits when mak-
ing a choice on the environment. The results presented here corroborate the
aforementioned economy vs. ecology polarization in environmental politics.
In Chapter 2 we contended that the demand for the environment should
not only be explained by price and income effects but also by shared normative
notions of appropriateness and ideological preferences for the collective good
environment. Economists tend to regard voters as undergoing cost-benefit
analyses when making a decision at ballots in order to maximize personal
utility. We do not contradict this conventional wisdom but plead for an in-
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tegration of socially constructed views and concepts. Especially in the case
of environmental policy this is deemed to be crucial: the emergence of left-
libertarian and ecology parties in advanced industrial democracies must also
be seen in the light of citizens’ frustration with capitalist politics’ emphasis on
economic growth, security and unregulated markets. Moreover, scholars claim
that citizens will follow rules and norms which are socially constructed and
cater to the public good rather than to individual maximization of profits. We
thus adopted a sociological institutionalist view, which guided us throughout
the analysis of the three projects on fossil energy taxation. As we showed,
the three projects were all rejected by the electorate. However, different tax
schemes and modes of revenue recycling yielded slightly different results for
the three projects.
Our results thus question the pervasiveness of the price and income ar-
gument put forth by economic inquiry. Although price and income effects
explain a sizeable portion of the variance, when introducing predictors per-
taining to ideological considerations, we increase the predictive power of the
models considerably. Not only do our estimations corroborate previous results
on environmental voting but the variables pointing to the ideological compo-
nents of the vote are highly significant and robust too. We therefore argue
that scholars should include variables going beyond price and income effects
when analyzing votes on environmental issues. It thus seems reasonable to
conceive of citizens as being led not only by cost-benefit considerations but
also by perceptions of what is normatively appropriate for society at large
when making a choice on a public good such as the environment.
Thus, we found ample evidence that traditional cost-benefit analyses might
not suffice to explain voters’ decisions at ballots. In Chapter 3 we followed
this argument but refined it by classifying the electorate into five different
voter groups based on open-ended survey questions on respondents’ reasons
for approval or dismissal of the bills. The motive to dig deeper into these vote
considerations was twofold: on the one hand it presented a unique opportu-
nity to learn more about voting arguments captured neither by micro-level
nor by macro-level data, on the other hand we challenged and expanded the
conventional public choice approach often used for analyses of environmen-
tal votes. The voter typology was derived by theoretical considerations and
backed up by explorative inquiry into the survey responses. We were guided
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by the concept of economic voting, which states that voters will re-elect the
incumbent when they perceive economic performance to be satisfactory.
In general, we found that a better perception of the nation’s welfare in-
creases the acceptability of environmental proposals at ballots. Additionally,
voters react very sensitively to hikes in the costs of living; they are thus more
likely to rebuke green policy proposals when they believe to bear higher per-
sonal living costs. However, we also found that for some voters having full
pocketbooks does not necessarily further the cause of environmental protec-
tion; the contrary is true: when these citizens feel confident about their per-
sonal spending situation material considerations seem to prevail. This result
is very interesting in that it points to the long-standing debate on whether
higher income classes are more likely to support environmental policy - a de-
bate which is far from being resolved. Hence, the analysis showed that it is
fruitful to apply models of economic voting to referendums in direct democ-
racy, especially as we were able to gather information on voters’ reasons for
their respective decisions.
Finally, Chapter 4 analyzes environmental policymaking under the influ-
ence of strong interest associations in the pre-parliamentary phase. I claimed
that the environmental policy space might be changing and that the con-
sequence thereof would be new forms of alliances. As aforementioned, the
antagonism between further protection of the environment and the allocation
of resources is especially marked in this policy field.
The actors’ responses to the four bills which had been submitted to con-
sultation proved very insightful. With the help of visual representation of
corporate and collective actors’ relative agreement to the bills, I was able to
demonstrate, contrary to expectations, that the traditional conflict lines in
Swiss environmental policy are very robust. Thus, cross-class alliances only
took place very rarely as the respective left-right camps were defined by strong
cohesion. Only for two cases did I find deviations from the socialist-capitalist
politics dimension. But these were cases were either bargaining had rendered
the bills utterly tame or where consensus was established on the uselessness of
incentive taxes in the specific policy domain due to prior regulation. For, the
overcoming of traditional conflict lines in environmental policy in Switzerland
is complicated by rent-seeking by strong organized business vis-à-vis a weak
federal government and a polity characterized by corporatist structures and
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consociationalism.
Finally, this also sheds light on the linkages between the referendum phase
analyzed in Chapters 2 and 3, and the pre-referendum phase studies in Chap-
ter 4. Using the answers from the answers to the consultation procedure, it
becomes clear why the three projects in 2000 were doomed to fail: temporal
overlapping of several policies and a tax scheme deemed unfavorable to the
economy hindered the projects’ chance of success. Secondly, the insight gained
from the pre-parliamentary phase regarding business support is crucial and has
also been underlined in a recent work (Halbheer, Niggli & Schmutzler 2006).
Thus, in referendum as in pre-referndum phases, chances of approving envi-
ronmental policy is drastically reduced when the economy refrains from giving
its consent.
Moreover, moving away from a solely Swiss perspective, it is imaginable
to conceive of similar research questions in a comparative framework, too. As
recent developments and negotiations in global climate policy have shown,
increased cooperation and the inclusion of developing countries into interna-
tional treaties is called for. From this outlook, two strands of research could
be pursued extending the present work.
Firstly, the most obvious avenue to continue on would be a comprehensive
comparison with additional countries. In the present study, the interest lay on
Switzerland, which is especially suitable for voting behavior analyses since it
disposes of the most comprehensive provision of direct democratic instruments.
However, it is possible to study referendums on the sub-national context where
they are becoming more frequent. A comparative design would permit to put
the results obtained in Swiss environmental referendums in perspective and
thus, to learn more about citizens’ stated preferences and their opinion for-
mation processes when making a choice on green issues. Secondly, in the
same vein, a more comprehensive comparison of emission abatement policies
in countries is advisable. It would be particularly interesting to compare the
design and enforcement of green policy in other advanced industrial democra-
cies; and, since this will become crucial, the scope might also be extended to
the developing world. In the same manner as done here, the hypothesis of a
shifting of conflict lines and the re-configuration of the environmental policy
space could be tested.
In a nutshell, the thesis brought about two major results: firstly, Swiss
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citizens’ voting behavior is not only influenced by price and income effects
but also by ‘ideological’ preferences and a logic of appropriateness. Adhering
to principles which emphasize redistributive politics, equality and the regu-
lation of markets, fosters the approval to environmental protection measures
at national ballots. However, voting behavior is not immune to changes in
macro-economic performance nor to citizens’ own financial predicaments ei-
ther. Approval therefore rises as the country’s and the individual’s perceived
welfare increase. Secondly, environmental policymaking is constrained by a
sustained conflict line opposing socialist to capitalist politics. Pressure group
politics and the facile access of organized business to the parliamentary arena
impede the effective overcoming of the distributive conflict in Swiss environ-
mental policy.
Thus, by accounting for the extensive rights and obligations direct demo-
cratic institutions entail, I was able to highlight the special role attributed to
the people to act as a veto player. This has far-reaching implications to policy
from a normative point of view. While the people prevented the introduction
of an incentive tax on fossil energy at national ballots in the year 2000, bour-
geois and conservative parties, and organized business pressured government
to refrain from a compulsory incentive tax in the CO2-law just a few years
earlier. Furthermore, Swiss citizens, in their role as voters, seem reluctant
to support environmental policy in times of lackluster economic performance
and when they perceive their personal financial situation to be dismal.
Despite a recent study’s results, which showed that Switzerland is among
the countries with the highest environmental concern (Franzen 2003), I un-
derlined the difficulty in implementing environmental policy in Switzerland.
However, the lessons that emerge from the present research, point at nec-
essary conditions to be met in the design of future policy. Three insights
emerge from this thesis; namely that information, timing and competitiveness
concerns are crucial to environmental policymaking. Evidently, none can be
addressed without taking into account the other two, thus, they are mutually
dependent.
Firstly, information: in the year 2000 all bills were rejected although two
of them had been prepared by parliament and had thus garnered wide support
across party lines. Especially surprising in this respect is the rebuttal of the
bills by the industrial sectors we analyzed, since all of these energy-intensive
industries would have been exempted from the taxes. It seems that this mes-
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sage did not get across to blue-collar voters. Thus, this calls for intensified
information efforts by public authorities in the light of very complex and only
thinly differentiated green ballots. However, this alone cannot account for the
defeat of these projects. Instead, we must address the second crucial issue,
namely timing.
Timing must be understood in two ways; firstly, timing related to how
and when the projects relating to incentive taxes were presented (ch. 2 &
4), and to how proposals fare in the light of economic circumstances (ch.
3). As aforementioned the bills put to vote in 2000 coincided with the entry
into force of the CO2-law. Hence, unlucky timing, cited numerous times in the
consultation answers, was one of the main reasons why business gave a negative
voting recommendation for the three projects. However, public administration
had its hands tied as to the date of the vote on the bills, since they had been
launched by the ecological movement. This parallel policymaking effort was
finally counter-productive. But timing also seems to be a crucial factor as
regards the people’s willingness to spend on the environment according to
the business cycle. As I showed, citizens are more likely to spend on the
environment when their economic situation looks brighter. This implies, on
the other hand, that government and administration can, to a certain extent,
try to put environmental projects before the people during times of economic
upswing, as during the last two years. It goes beyond conventional wisdom
that environmental issues fare better in public opinion when the threat of an
economic downturn is distant and unlikely.
Finally, the question of economic competitiveness looms over the legisla-
tor’s head when designing public policy in general, and environmental policy
in particular. I proved the claim that questions relating to competition and
external trade are primordial to a majority of political and societal actors in-
volved. This is on the one hand shown by the statistics in Table 4.3, and on the
other hand, by the harsh dismissal of the 1994 project by the bourgeois and
conservative alliance. The project not only foresaw earmarking of revenues
and the exemption from the tax only for highly energy-intensive industries,
but also neglected emission certificates and was highly restrictive on emission
reductions abroad. Thus, cost-neutrality and more effective pollution control
abroad remain crucial to the regulated community - not taking these elements
into account will make the passing of environmental policy (and economic
instruments in environmental policymaking) virtually impossible.
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The lessons learnt from the Swiss experience show that environmental pol-
icy faces tough-to-overcome obstacles even in times of increasing awareness of
environmental issues such as anthropogenic climate change and in the light
of a healthy global economy. Seldom has public opinion reacted so fiercely to
global pollution as it has in the last few years. But policymakers and firms
are slow to adapt to environmental exigencies. Indeed, these results seem to
point to a rather pessimistic picture: the implementation of stringent environ-
mental policy is not only hindered by strong business actors refusing market
intervention - even if earmarking is avoided - but also by the voters, who in
their capacity as veto players prevent green policies when economic confidence
is low. Thus, in direct democracy, instruments need to be defined very pre-
cisely and information about the bills must be clear, transparent and reach
voters if they are to accept such policy. Additionally, environmental policy
must not impact on citizens’ or the country’s economic conditions and must
avoid earmarking of revenues. Yet, electoral logic in the light of surging global
environmental concern and changing constituencies might provide remedy in
the not so distant future given that the issue succeeds in occupying developed
countries’ agendas as intensely as it has in recent years.
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B Appendix to Chapter 3
Table B.1: List of all popular votes under scrutiny from 1983 to 1992a
Date VOX Name of project Pro in %
27.02.1983 191 PR concerning the reorganisation of customs
on gasoline and fuel
53%
27.02.1983 192 PR concerning a constitutional article on
energyb
51%
26.02.1984 211 PR concerning an incentive tax on heavy
freight transportation
59%
26.02.1984 212 PR concerning the introduction of a vignette
for highway use
53%
06.12.1987 341 PR concerning the concept of RAIL 2000 57%
06.12.1987 343 PI for the protection of the moors -
Rothenthurm-Initiative
58%
01.04.1990 391 PI ‘Stop the concrete - for a restriction on road
construction’
29%
01.04.1990 392 PI ‘for a region Morat/Yverdon without high-
ways’
33%
01.04.1990 393 PI ‘for a region Knonauer Amt without high-
ways’
31%
01.04.1990 394 PI ‘for a region Bienne/Soleure without high-
ways’
34%
23.09.1990 401 PI for an exit from nuclear power 47%
23.09.1990 402 PI for a construction ban on nuclear power
plants
55%
23.09.1990 403 PR on constitutional amendment ‘energy ar-
ticle’
71%
23.09.1990 404 PR: Federal law on road traffic 53%
03.03.1991 412 PI for the promotion of public transport 37%
17.05.1992 442 PR: Federal law on the protection of the wa-
ters (GSchG)
66%
17.05.1992 443 PI ‘for the salvation of our waters’ 37%
27.09.1992 461 PR on the construction of a New Rail Link
through the Alps (NRLA)
64%
a PR: Popular Referendum; PI: Popular Initiative.
b Although accepted by a popular majority, the project was not adopted since it did
not gain the majority of the people and the cantons which is required for
constitutional amendments.
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Table B.2: List of all popular votes 1993-2004 continueda
Date VOX Name of project Pro in %
07.03.1993 481 PR on the Federal Decision on the increase of
fuel price
55%
06.06.1993 491 PI ‘40 training grounds are enough - env. pro-
tection in the army’
45%
20.02.1994 521 PR on the increase and prolongation of a high-
way tax (Vignette)
69%
20.02.1994 522 PR on the increase and prolongation of a high-
way tax for trucks
72%
20.02.1994 523 PR on an option for an introduction of a
performance-related highway tax for trucks
67%
20.02.1994 524 PI to protect the Alps from transit traffic 52%
27.09.1998 641 PR concerning an incentive tax on trucks 57%
29.11.1998 651 PR concerning the financing of public trans-
port
64%
12.03.2000 695 PI to cut motorized traffic in half to improve
living space
21%
24.09.2000 711 PI ‘Solar Initiative’ 31%
24.09.2000 712 PR/Counterproposal: Energy Conservation
Package
45%
24.09.2000 713 PR: Constitutional article: Green tax reform 45%
04.03.2001 733 PI for maximum speed of 30 km/h within city
limits
20%
02.12.2001 752 PI ‘For a secure pension system - tax energy
instead of labour!’
23%
18.05.2003 813 PI ‘One Sunday per season without cars’ 38%
18.05.2003 822 PI ‘Energy without nuclear power!’ 34%
18.05.2003 823 PI ‘MoratoriumPlus - For an exit from nuclear
power’
42%
08.02.2004 831 PR: Counterproposal to the PI of October 3,
2003 ‘Avanti - for secure and efficient high-
ways’
37%
a VOX nr. 351, 361, and 381 were not used because of missing data for some
variables.
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Table C.1: All actors used for analysis with respective abbreviations
Abbreviation Actor name
ACS Automobile Club Suisse
ASLOCA Swiss Association of Tenants
ASTAG Swiss Association of Road Freight Transportation)
ATE Association Transport & Environment
AVES Action for a Reasonable Swiss Energy Policy
AVIA Federation of independent oil importers
economiesuisse Swiss Business Federation (formerly Vorort)
- Swiss Energy Forum
FRSP Fédération Romande des Syndicats Patronaux
- Greenpeace
HEV Swiss Association of Real Estate Proprietors
- SwissHoldings - Federation of Industrial and Service
Groups
LITRA Information Service for Public Transport
ÖBU Swiss Association for Ecologically Conscious Management
PDC Christian-Democratic Party
PES Greens
PEV Protestant People’s Party
PLS Swiss Liberal Party
PRD Radical Party/Free Democratic Party
ProClim Forum for Climate and Global Change
- ProNatura/Swiss League for the Protection of the Environ-
ment
PSL Automobile/Freedom Party
PSS Social Democratic Party of Switzerland
SAB Swiss Association for Mountainous Regions
SSIC Swiss Society of Chemical Industries
swissmem Swiss Association of Machinery Manufacturers
TCS Touring Club Suisse
travail.suisse formerly Swiss Christian Trade Union (CSC)
UCS Union des Centrales Suisses d’Electricité
UDC Swiss People’s Party
UDF Federal Democratic Union
UP Union Pétrolière/Petrol Union
USP Swiss Farmers’ Association
UPSA Professionnal Swiss Union of Automobile
USAM Union of Small Swiss Employers
USS Swiss Federation of Trade Unions
UTP Trade Union of Transport
VKMB New Small Farmers Initiative
VSA Swiss Federation of Public Sector Employees
WWF World Wildlife Fund
Ta
bl
e
C
.2
:
D
es
ig
n
of
th
e
fo
ur
pr
e-
le
gi
sla
tiv
e
dr
af
ts
P
ol
ic
y
P
ac
ka
ge
C
on
su
lt
at
io
n
P
ro
ce
du
re
L
aw
in
fo
rc
e
G
oa
l
In
st
ru
m
en
t
an
d
ta
x
le
ve
l
E
st
im
at
ed
re
ve
nu
es
R
ec
yc
lin
g
sc
he
m
e
Sp
ec
ia
l
P
ro
vi
si
on
s
R
ev
is
io
n
of
th
e
Fe
d-
er
al
B
ill
on
th
e
P
ro
-
te
ct
io
n
of
th
e
E
nv
i-
ro
nm
en
t
(L
P
E
1)
Ju
ne
20
-
O
ct
o-
be
r
31
,1
99
0
Ju
ly
1,
19
97
In
tr
od
uc
tio
n
of
m
ar
ke
t-
ba
se
d
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
on
po
llu
ta
nt
s
In
ce
nt
iv
e
ta
xe
s
on
Vo
la
til
e
O
rg
an
ic
C
om
-
po
ne
nt
s
(V
O
C
s)
,
he
at
in
g
oi
l
an
d
D
ie
se
l
co
nt
ai
ni
ng
m
or
e
th
an
0.
1%
of
Su
lfu
r;
an
d
on
fe
rt
ili
ze
rs
Ta
x
on
V
O
C
s
an
d
he
at
in
g
oi
l:
C
H
F
30
0m
;
ta
x
on
fe
rt
ili
ze
rs
:
C
H
F
12
0m
Fu
ll
re
di
st
ri
bu
tio
n
of
re
ve
nu
es
fr
om
V
O
C
s;
ea
rm
ar
ki
ng
of
ta
x
on
fe
rt
ili
ze
rs
fo
r
ec
o-
pr
oj
ec
ts
re
la
te
d
to
ag
ri
cu
ltu
re
-
Fe
de
ra
l
B
ill
on
a
C
O
2-
Ta
x
(L
C
O
1)
M
ar
ch
29
-
Se
pt
em
be
r
30
,
19
94
-
St
ab
ili
za
tio
n
of
C
O
2-
em
is
si
on
s
at
19
90
le
ve
ls
by
20
00
In
ce
nt
iv
e
ta
xe
s
on
fo
ss
il
fu
el
s;
ta
x
le
ve
ls
in
19
96
/1
99
8/
20
00
:
C
H
F
12
.-/
24
.-/
36
.-
pe
r
t
C
O
2
R
ev
en
ue
s
by
th
e
ye
ar
20
00
:
C
H
F
1,
30
0m
O
ne
th
ir
d
to
be
ea
rm
ar
ke
d
fo
r
en
-
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l
an
d
en
er
gy
-e
fffi
ci
en
cy
pr
oj
ec
ts
;
tw
o
th
ir
ds
re
di
st
ri
bu
te
d
to
th
e
ec
on
om
y
(1
/4
)
an
d
th
e
po
pu
la
tio
n
(3
/4
)
E
xe
m
pt
io
n
of
en
er
gy
-
in
te
ns
iv
e
in
du
st
ri
es
Fe
de
ra
l
B
ill
on
th
e
R
ed
uc
tio
n
of
C
O
2-
E
m
is
si
on
s
/
C
O
2-
La
w
(L
C
O
2)
O
ct
ob
er
23
-
D
ec
em
be
r
20
,
19
96
M
ay
1,
20
00
R
ed
uc
tio
n
of
C
O
2-
em
is
si
on
s
by
10
%
at
19
90
le
ve
ls
by
20
10
Tw
o
re
du
ct
io
n
sc
he
m
es
ba
se
d
on
VA
s:
he
at
in
g
oi
l:
-1
5%
/-
18
%
;
fu
el
s
-5
%
/0
%
.
Su
bs
id
ia
ry
ta
x
on
ly
,
le
ve
l
in
20
00
on
he
at
in
g
oi
l:
C
H
F
30
.-
pe
rt
C
O
2,
on
fu
el
s
C
H
F
21
0.
-p
er
t
C
O
2
R
ev
en
ue
s
fr
om
he
at
in
g
oi
li
n
th
e
ye
ar
20
00
:
C
H
F
50
0m
;f
ro
m
fu
el
s
C
H
F
2,
50
0m
Fu
ll
re
st
itu
tio
n
to
ec
on
om
y
an
d
po
pu
la
-
tio
n
In
ce
nt
iv
e
ta
x
on
ly
if
re
du
ct
io
n
ta
rg
et
s
m
is
se
d;
ex
em
pt
io
n
of
fir
m
s
fr
om
la
te
r
ta
x
if
th
ey
co
nc
lu
de
d
VA
s
w
ith
go
ve
rn
m
en
t;
Jo
in
t
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n
(J
I)
al
lo
w
ed
C
on
su
lta
tio
n
P
ro
ce
-
du
re
on
th
e
M
ea
su
re
s
re
ga
rd
in
g
C
om
-
pl
ia
nc
e
w
ith
th
e
C
O
2-
La
w
(L
C
O
3)
O
ct
ob
er
20
,
20
04
-
Ja
nu
ar
y
20
,2
00
5
-
R
ed
uc
tio
n
of
C
O
2-
em
is
si
on
s
by
10
%
at
19
90
le
ve
ls
by
20
10
V
3:
he
at
in
g
oi
l
-1
5%
w
ith
in
ce
nt
iv
e
ta
x
of
C
H
F
35
.-
pe
r
t
C
O
2;
fu
el
s-
8%
w
ith
VA
sa
nd
cl
im
at
e
pe
nn
y
of
C
H
F
0.
01
pe
r
lit
er
of
ga
so
-
lin
e
R
ev
en
ue
s
fr
om
ta
x:
C
H
F
60
0m
,
fr
om
VA
:
C
H
F
70
-1
15
m
E
ar
m
ar
ki
ng
of
re
v-
en
ue
s
fr
om
cl
im
at
e
pe
nn
y
fo
r
em
is
si
on
-
re
du
ct
io
n
m
ea
su
re
s
in
Sw
it
ze
rl
an
d
an
d
ab
ro
ad
vi
a
C
le
an
D
e-
ve
lo
pm
en
t
M
ec
ha
ni
sm
s
an
d
Jo
in
t
Im
pl
em
en
-
ta
tio
ns
;
fu
ll
re
st
itu
tio
n
of
re
ve
nu
es
fr
om
su
b-
si
di
ar
y
in
ce
nt
iv
e
ta
x
to
po
pu
la
tio
n
an
d
ec
on
om
y
Fo
ur
di
ffe
re
nt
m
ea
-
su
re
s
(V
1
-
V
4)
pr
op
os
ed
by
pu
b-
lic
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n;
V
3
ba
se
d
on
VA
s;
su
bs
id
ia
ry
in
ce
nt
iv
e
ta
x
on
ly
if
re
du
ct
io
n
ta
rg
et
s
m
is
se
d

Bibliography
Achen, Christopher H. 1992. “Social Psychology, Demographic Variables, and
Linear Regression: Breaking the Iron Triangle in Voting Research.” Po-
litical Behavior 14:195–211.
Achen, Christopher H. & Larry M. Bartels. 2004. “Musical Chairs: Pocket-
book Voting and the Limits of Democratic Accountability.” Paper pre-
pared for Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Asoociation, September 1-5, 2004, Chicago.
Anderson, William & Daniel Mizak. 2006. “Politics of environmental law: Po-
litical ideology, elitism or urban-rural interests?” Public Choice 129:131–
157.
Anson, José & Olivier Cadot. 2004. “Par-delà le Röstigraben: l’électorat
suisse partagé face à l’UE.” Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics
140(2):171–206.
Ballmer-Cao, Thanh-Huyen, Caroline Eggli, Mario Konishi, Michael Lanszki
& Lionel Marquis. 2000. Analyse des votations fédérales du 24 septembre
2000, VOX No 71. Université de Genève.
Baranzini, Andrea, Philippe Thalmann & Camille Gonseth. 2004. Swiss Cli-
mate Policy: Combining VAs with other Instruments under the Menace
of a CO2 Tax. In Voluntary Approaches in Climate Policy, ed. Andrea
Baranzini & Philippe Thalmann. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA,
USA: Edward Elgar pp. 249–276.
Bernard, Alain, Marc Vielle & Laurent Viguier. 2005. Carbon Tax and Inter-
national Emissions Trading: A Swiss Perspective. In Coupling Climate
and Economic Dynamics, ed. A. Haurie & Laurent Viguier. New York;
London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Bernauer, Thomas & Ladina Caduff. 2004. “In whose interest? Pressure group
politics, economic competition and environmental regulation.” Journal of
Public Policy 24(1):99–126.
Bornstein, Nicholas. 2007. “Alliance Formation in the Pre-Parliamentary
Phase in Switzerland: Towards a Re-Configuration of the Environmental
Policy Space?” under review.
Bornstein, Nicholas & Bruno Lanz. 2007. “Voting on the environment: Price
or ideology? Evidence from Swiss referendums.” under review.
Bornstein, Nicholas & Philippe Thalmann. 2007. “‘I pay enough taxes al-
ready!’ Applying economic voting models to environmental referendums.”
under review.
103
104 Bibliography
Bowler, Shaun & Todd Donovan. 1998. Demanding Choices: Opinion, Voting,
and Direct Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Brunner, Matthias, Hanspeter Kriesi & François Lorétan. 2004. “VoxIt: stan-
dardised post-votes surveys [electronic database].” SIDOS Service su-
isse d’information et d’archivage de données pour les sciences sociales,
Neuchâtel. Distributed by SIDOS.
Buchanan, James M. & Gordon Tullock. 1975. “Polluters’ Profits and Polit-
ical Response: Direct Controls versus Taxes.” The American Economic
Review 65(1):139–147.
Bühlmann, Marc. 2006. Politische Partizipation im kommunalen Kontext. Der
Einfluss lokaler Kontexteigenschaften auf individuelles politisches Par-
tizipationsverhalten. Berner Studien zur Politikwissenschaft Band 13.
Bern: Haupt Verlag.
Butler, Richard V. & Michael D. Maher. 1986. “The Control of Externalities:
Abatement vs. Damage Prevention.” Southern Economic Journal 52.
Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren Miller & Donald Stokes. 1960.
The American Voter. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Carter, Neil. 2006. “Party Politicization of the Environment in Britain.” Party
Politics 12(6):747–767.
Christin, Thomas, Simon Hug & Pascal Sciarini. 2002. “Interests and in-
formation in referendum voting: An analysis of Swiss voters.” European
Journal of Political Research 41(6):759–776.
Conover, Pamela Johnston & Stanley Feldman. 1986. “Emotional Reactions to
the Economy: I’m Mad as Hell and I’m Not Going to Take It Anymore.”
American Journal of Political Science 30:50–78.
Conseil Fédéral, (CF). 1993. “Message relatif à une révision de la loi fédérale
sur la protection de l’environnement (LPE) du 7 juin 1993.” Feuille
Fédérale, Vol. II, 32, pp. 1337-1477.
Converse, Philip E. 1964. The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics.
In Ideology and Discontent, ed. David E. Apter. New York: Free Press
pp. 206–261.
Cox, Trevor F. & Michael A. Cox. 2001. Multidimensional Scaling. 2nd ed.
Boca Raton, London: Chapman & Hall/CRC.
Daley, Dorothy M. 2007. “Voluntary Approaches to Environmental Problems:
Exploring the Rise of Nontraditional Public Policy.” The Policy Studies
Journal 35:165–180.
Bibliography 105
Dalton, Russell J. 2000. The Decline of Party Identifications. In Parties with-
out Partisans. Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies, ed.
Russell J. Dalton & Martin P. Wattenberg. Oxford: Oxford University
Press pp. 19–36.
Daugbjerg, Carsten & Anders Branth Pedersen. 2004. “New Policy Ideas
and Old Policy Networks: Implementing Green Taxation in Scandinavia.”
Journal of Public Policy 24(2):219–249.
Deacon, Robert & Perry Shapiro. 1975. “Private Preference for Collective
Goods Revealed through Voting on Referenda.” American Economic Re-
view 65(5):943–955.
Diekmann, Andreas & Peter Preisendörfer. 1992. “Persönliches Umweltverhal-
ten. Diskrepanz zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit.” Kölner Zeitschrift
für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 44(2):226–251.
Diekmann, Andreas & Peter Preisendörfer. 2003. “Green and greenback. The
behavioral effects of environmental attitudes in low-cost and high-cost
situations.” Rationality and Society 15(4):441–472.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York:
Harper & Row.
Elster, Jon. 1989. “Social Norms and Economic Theory.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 3(4):99–117.
Erikson, Robert S. 1989. “Economic Conditions and the Presidential Vote.”
American Political Science Review 83:567–573.
Esty, Daniel C. 2001. “Bridging the Trade-Environment Divide.” Journal of
Economic Perspectives 15.
Felder, Stefan & Reto Schleiniger. 2002. “Environmental tax reform: efficiency
and political feasibility.” Ecological Economics 42(1):107–116.
Finger, Matthias & Simon Hug. 1992. “Green politics in Switzerland. Envi-
ronmental attitudes and political parties.” European Journal of Political
Research 21:289–306.
Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Fischel, William A. 1979. “Determinants of Voting on Environmental Qual-
ity: A Study of a New Hampshire Pulp Mill Referendum.” Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 6:107–118.
106 Bibliography
Flanagan, Scott C. 1982. “Changing Values in Advanced Industrial Societies.
Inglehart’s Silent Revolution from the Perspective of Japanese Findings.”
Comparative Political Studies 14(4):403–44.
Flanagan, Scott C. & Aie-Ree Lee. 2003. “The New Politics, Culture Wars,
and the Authoritarian-Libertarian Value Change in Advanced Industrial
Democracies.” Comparative Political Studies 36(3):235–270.
Franzen, Axel. 2003. “Environmental Attitudes in International Comparison:
An Analysis of the ISSP Surveys 1993 and 2000.” Social Science Quarterly
84(2):297–308.
Greene, W.H. 1999. Econometric Analysis. New York: Prentice Hall.
Hahn, Robert W. 1989. “Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems:
How the Patient Followed the Doctor’s Orders.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 3(2):95–114.
Halbheer, Daniel, Sarah Niggli & Armin Schmutzler. 2006. “What Does it
Take to Sell Environmental Policy? An Empirical Analysis of Referen-
dum Data.” Environmental & Resource Economics 33:441–462.
Hammar, Henrik & Sverker C. Jagers. 2007. “What is a fair CO2 tax increase?
On fair emission reductions in the transport sector.” Ecological Economics
61:377–387.
Häusermann, Silja. 2006. “Changing coalitions in social policy reform: the
politics of new social needs and demands.” Journal of European Social
Policy 16(1):5–21.
Hepburn, Cameron. 2006. “Discounting climate change damages: Working
note for the Stern review.” University of Oxford.
Hug, Simon. 1990. “The emergence of the Swiss Ecological Party: A dynamic
model.” European Journal of Political Research 18:645–670.
Hug, Simon & George Tsebelis. 2002. “Veto Players and Referendums Around
the World.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 14(4):465–515.
Hug, Simon & Tobias Schulz. 2007. “Left-Right Positions of Political Parties
in Switzerland.” Party Politics 13:305–330.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1971. “The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational
Change in Post-Industrial Societies.” American Political Science Review
65:991–1017.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1977. The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Politi-
cal Styles Among Western Publics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Bibliography 107
Inglehart, Ronald. 1995. “Public Support for Environmental Protection: Ob-
jective Problems and Subjective Values in 43 Societies.” PS: Political
Science and Politics 28(1):57–72.
Inglehart, Ronald & Scott C. Flanagan. 1987. “Value Change in Industrial
Societies.” American Political Science Review 81(4):1289–1319.
Ingold, Karin. 2007. “Analyse des Mécanismes de Décision: Le Cas de la Poli-
tique Climatique Suisse.” Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Geneva.
IPCC. 2007. “Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change WGI 4th Assessment Report.” IPCC
Geneva.
Jasper, James M. 1990. Nuclear Politics. Energy and the State in the United
States, Sweden, and France. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press.
Jones, Kelvyn, Ronald J. Johnston & Charles J. Pattie. 1992. “People, Places
and Regions: Exploring the Use of Multi-Level Modelling in the Analysis
of Electoral Data.” British Journal of Political Science 22(3):343–380.
Jordahl, Henrik. 2006. “An economic analysis of voting in Sweden.” Public
Choice 127:251–273.
Kahn, Matthew E. 2002. “Demographic Change and the Demand for En-
vironmental Regulation.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
21(1):45–62.
Kahn, Matthew E. & John G. Matsusaka. 1997. “Demand for Environmental
Goods: Evidence from Voting Patterns on California Initiatives.” Journal
of Law and Economics 40:137–173.
Kaufmann, Vincent, Christophe Jemelin & Jean-Marie Guidez. 2001. Au-
tomobiles et modes de vie urbains: Quel degré de liberté? Paris: La
Documentation Française.
Kinder, Donald R. & D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1979. “Economic Discontent and
Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Eco-
nomic Judgments in Congressional Voting.” American Journal of Political
Science 23:495–527.
Kinder, Donald R. & D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1981. “Sociotropic Politics: The
American Case.” British Journal of Political Science 11:129–161.
Kinder, Donald R., Gordon S. Adams & Paul W. Gronke. 1989. “Economics
and Politics in the 1984 American Presidential Election.” American Jour-
nal of Political Science 33(2):491–515.
108 Bibliography
Kirchgässner, Gebhard & Friedrich Schneider. 2003. “On the political economy
of environmental policy.” Public Choice 115:369–396.
Kitschelt, Herbert. 1989. The Logics of Party Formation. Ecological Politics
in Belgium and West Germany. Ithaca and London: Cornell University
Press.
Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. The Transformation of European Social Democracy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kitschelt, Herbert P. 1986. “Political Opportunity Structures and Political
Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies.” British Journal
of Political Science 16:57–85.
Kitschelt, Herbert P. 1988. “Left-Libertarian Parties. Explaining Innovation
in Competitive Party Systems.” World Politics 40:194–234.
Knoepfel, Peter. 1992. La protection de l’environnement en proie aux prob-
lèmes d’acceptation et aux déficits de mise en œuvre. In Droit de
l’environnement. Mise en œuvre et coordination, ed. C.-A. Morand. Hel-
bing und Lichtenhahn pp. 3–57.
Knoepfel, Peter, Stéphane Nahrath & Jérôme Savary. 2007. “Analyse des poli-
tiques de l’environnement.” Matériel de cours de l’IDHEAP no 8/2007;
IDHEAP, Chavannes-près-Renens.
Kolstad, Charles D. & Michael Toman. 2005. The Economics of Climate
Policy. In Handbook of Environmental Economics, ed. Karl-Göran Mäler
& Jeffrey Vincent. Vol. 3 North-Holland: Elsevier pp. 1561–1618.
Kramer, Gerald H. 1971. “Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior,
1896-1964.” American Political Science Review 65:131–143.
Kramer, Gerald H. 1983. “The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate- versus
Individual-level Findings on Economics and Elections, and Sociotropic
Voting.” American Political Science Review 77:92–111.
Kreuzer, Markus. 1990. “New Politics: Just Post-Materialist? The Case of
the Austrian and Swiss Greens.” West European Politics 14(4):12–30.
Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1996. Le clivage linguistique: Problèmes de compréhen-
sion entre les communautés linguistiques en Suisse. Bern: Swiss Federal
Statistical Office.
Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1999. “Opinion Formation and Change. The case of
the Swiss policy against air pollution caused by cars.” Unpublished
manuscript, University of Geneva.
Bibliography 109
Kriesi, Hanspeter. 2001. “The Federal Parliament: The Limits of Institutional
Reform.” West European Politics 24(2):59–76.
Kriesi, Hanspeter. 2005. Direct democratic choice. The Swiss experience. Lan-
ham, MD: Lexington Books.
Kriesi, Hanspeter & Maya Jegen. 2001. “The Swiss energy policy elite: The
actor constellation of a policy domain in transition.” European Journal
of Political Research 39:251–287.
Kruskal, Joseph B. & Myron Wish. 1978. Multidimensional Scaling. Quan-
titative Applications in the Social Sciences. Beverly Hills, London: Sage
Publications.
Ladner, Andreas. 1989. Switzerland: The Green and Alternative Parties. In
New Politics in Western Europe. The Rise and Success of Green Par-
ties and Alternative Lists, ed. Ferdinand Müller-Rommel. Boulder, San
Francisco & London: Westview Press pp. 155–165.
Lewis-Beck, Michael S. 1988. Economics and Elections. The Major Western
Democracies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Lĳphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Per-
formance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven; London: Yale University
Press.
Linder, Wolf. 2006. Direkte Demokratie. In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik,
ed. Ulrich Klöti, Peter Knoepfel, Hanspeter Kriesi, Wolf Linder, Yannis
Papadopoulos & Pascal Sciarini. 4th ed. Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher
Zeitung pp. 103–125.
Lupia, Arthur. 1994. “Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Vot-
ing Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections.” American Polit-
ical Science Review 88(1):63–76.
Luskin, Robert C. 1990. “Explaining Political Sophistication.” Political Be-
havior 12(4):331–361.
Mach, André. 2006. Associations d’intérêts. In Handbuch der Schweizer Poli-
tik, ed. Ulrich Klöti, Peter Knoepfel, Hanspeter Kriesi, Wolf Linder, Yan-
nis Papadopoulos & Pascal Sciarini. 4th ed. Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher
Zeitung pp. 369–391.
MacKuen, Michael, Robert Erikson & James Stimson. 1992. “Peasants or
Bankers? The American Electorate and the U.S. Economy.” American
Political Science Review 86:597–611.
110 Bibliography
Maddison, David. 2006. “Environmental Kuznets curves: A spatial economet-
ric approach.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
51:218–230.
March, James G. & Johan P. Olsen. 1998. “The Institutional Dynamics of In-
ternational Political Orders.” International Organization 52(4):943–969.
Markus, Gregory B. 1988. “The Impact of Personal and National Economic
Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis.”
American Journal of Political Science 32:137–154.
Marquis, Lionel. 2004. “The Priming of Referendum Votes.” EPERN Working
Paper no. 17. Sussex European Institute.
McKibbin, Warwick J. & Peter J. Wilcoxen. 2002. “The Role of Economics
in Climate Change Policy.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 16(2):107–
129.
Mead, A. 1992. “Review of the development of multidimensional scaling meth-
ods.” The Statistician 41:27–39.
Müller, Hannes & F. Romann. 1999. Autofreie Haushalte: Ihre Mobilität und
die Folgen für Verkehrsplanung und Verkehrspolitik. Bern: Programm-
leitung NFP 41.
Neumayer, Eric. 2004. “The environment, left-wing political orientation and
ecological economics.” Ecological Economics 51:167–175.
OECD. 2001. “Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries. Issues
and Strategies.” Paris.
Papadopoulos, Yannis. 2001. “How Does Direct Democracy Matter? The Im-
pact of Referendum Votes on Politics and Policy-Making.”West European
Politics 24(2):35–58.
Pashigian, B. Peter. 1985. “Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests
Are Being Protected?” Economic Inquiry 23:551–585.
Pierce, John C. & Nicholas P. Lovrich. 1980. “Belief sytems concerning the
environment: The general public, attentive publics, and state legislators.”
Political Behavior 2(3).
Poguntke, Thomas. 1989. The New Politics Dimension in European Green Par-
ties. In New Politics in Western Europe. The Rise and Success of Green
Parties and Alternative Lists, ed. Ferdinand Müller-Rommel. Boulder,
San Francisco & London: Westview Press pp. 176–194.
Popkin, Samuel L. 1991. The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persua-
sion in Presidential Campaigns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bibliography 111
Rasbash, Jon, Fiona Steele, William Browne & Bob Prosser. 2004. A User’s
Guide to MLwiN. Version 2.0. University of London. Institute of Educa-
tion: Centre for Multilevel Modelling.
Sagoff, Mark. 1998. “Aggregation and deliberation in valuing environmental
public goods: A look beyond contingent pricing.” Ecological Economics
24:213–230.
Sagoff, Mark. 2003. “On the relation between preference and choice.” Journal
of Socio-Economics 31:587–598.
Salka, William M. 2001. “Urban-rural conflict over environmental policy in
the western United States.” American Review of Public Administration
31(1):33–48.
Sanders, David. 1991. “Government Popularity and the Next General Elec-
tion.” Political Quarterly 62:235–261.
Scharpf, Fritz W. 1997. Games Real Actors Play. Actor-Centered Institution-
alism in Policy Research. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Scharpf, Fritz W. 2000. “Institutions in Comparative Policy Research.” Com-
parative Political Studies 33:762–790.
Schneider, Friedrich & Jürgen Volkert. 1999. “No chance for incentive-oriented
environmental policies in representative democracies? A Public Choice
analysis.” Ecological Economics 31(1):123–138.
Schuler, Martin, Pierre Dessemontet, Christophe Jemelin, Alain Jarne, Nat-
acha Pasche & Werner Haug. 2007. Atlas des räumlichen Wandels der
Schweiz – Atlas des mutations spatiales de la Suisse. Zurich, Neuchâtel:
NZZ Libro; Office Fédéral de la Statistique.
Schwarz, Daniel. 2006. “Mehrheits- und Koalitionsbildung im schweizerischen
Nationalrat 1996-2005.” Studie im Auftrag der Parlamentsdienste der
Schweizerischen Bundesversammlung.
Sciarini, Pascal. 2006. Le processus législatif. In Handbuch der Schweizer
Politik, ed. Ulrich Klöti, Peter Knoepfel, Hanspeter Kriesi, Wolf Linder,
Yannis Papadopoulos & Pascal Sciarini. 4th ed. Zürich: Verlag Neue
Zürcher Zeitung pp. 491–525.
Sciarini, Pascal & Lionel Marquis. 2000. “Opinion Publique et politique ex-
térieure: le cas des votations populaires en Suisse.” International Political
Science Review 21(2):149–171.
Sciarini, Pascal & Matthias Finger. 1991. “Les Dimensions de l’Espace Poli-
tique Suisse et l’Intégration de la ‘Nouvelle Politique Écologique’.” Revue
Française de Science Politique 41:537–559.
112 Bibliography
Sciarini, Pascal, Nicholas Bornstein & Bruno Lanz. 2007. The determinants
of voting choices on environmental issues: A two-level analysis. In The
Dynamics of Referendum Campaigns. An International Perspective, ed.
C. H. de Vreese. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Sniderman, Paul M., Richard A. Brody & Philip E. Tetlock. 1991. Reasoning
and Choice. Explorations in Political Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Snĳders, Tom & Roel Bosker. 1999. Multilevel Analysis. An introduction to
basic and advanced multilevel modeling. London, Thousand Oaks, New
Delhi: Sage Publications.
Steenbergen, Marco R. & Bradford S. Jones. 2002. “Modeling Multilevel Data
Structures.” American Journal of Political Science 46(1):218–237.
Stigler, George J. 1971. “The theory of economic regulation.” The Bell Journal
of Economics and Management Science 2(1):3–21.
Thalmann, Philippe. 1997. Impôts écologiques. L’Exemple des taxes CO2.
Lausanne: Presses Polytechniques et Universitaires Romandes.
Thalmann, Philippe. 2004. “The public acceptance of green taxes: 2 million
voters express their opinion.” Public Choice 119(1-2):179–217.
Thalmann, Philippe & Andrea Baranzini. 2008. “Gradual Introduction of
Coercive Instruments in Climate Policy.” Critical Issues in Environmental
Taxation, Volume V, Oxford University Press.
Trechsel, Alexandre & Hanspeter Kriesi. 1996. Switzerland: The Referendum
and Initiative as a Centerpiece of the Political System. In The Referen-
dum Experience in Europe, ed. Michael Gallagher & Pier Vincenzo Uleri.
London: Macmillan pp. 185–208.
Trechsel, Alexandre & Pascal Sciarini. 1998. “Direct democracy in Switzer-
land: Do elites matter?” European Journal of Political Reserach 33:99–
124.
van Liere, Kent D. & Riley E. Dunlap. 1980. “The Social Bases of Environ-
mental Concern: A Review of Hypotheses, Explanations and Empirical
Evidence.” Public Opinion Quarterly 44(2):181–197.
Vatn, Arild. 2005. “Rationality, institutions and environmental policy.” Eco-
logical Economics 55:203–217.
Wallart, Nicolas & Beat Bürgenmeier. 1996. “L’acceptabilité des taxes incita-
tives en Suisse.” Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 132(1):3–30.
Bibliography 113
Weck-Hannemann, H. 1990. “Protectionism in direct democracy.” Journal of
Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146(3):389–418.
Zaller, John R. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Zellner, A. 1962. “An Efficient Method of Estimating Seemingly Unrelated
Regressions and Tests of Aggregation Bias.” Journal of the American
Statistical Association 57:500–509.

Nicholas Bornstein
Zurlindenstrasse 236 Birthdate: 25.12.1977
CH-8003 Zurich Citizenships: Swiss & Canadian
Ph. +41 79 383 71 21 Marital status: Single
Email: pharaoh@vtxmail.ch Place of Birth: St. Gall
Education
10.2004 - 10.2007 Docteur ès sciences
Three Essays on the Acceptability of Environmental Policy in Switzer-
land
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne (EPFL), Switzerland
10.2006 - 04.2007 Visiting scholar
Department of Political Science
University of Geneva, Switzerland
1998 - 2003 University degree licentiatus philosophiae
Media and Communication Studies, Political Science, and History
Master thesis: The EU on the Road to a Common Asylum and Migra-
tion Policy
University of Zurich, Switzerland
2000 - 2001 Visiting academic semester
Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Bordeaux, France
1992 - 1996 Cantonal high school diploma Type B - Latin
Gymnasium Münchenstein/Basel, Switzerland
Professional experience
10.2004 - 10.2007 Scientific research assistant & Project Manager
Research Lab on the Economics and Management of the Environment
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne (EPFL), Switzerland
05.2004 - 08.2004 Teaching and research assistant
Institute of Communication and Media Studies
University of Berne, Switzerland
11.2002 - 04.2004 Research assistant
Institute of Political Science
University of Zurich, Switzerland
08.2001 - 11.2001 Internship Public Relations
Trimedia Communications AG
Zurich, Switzerland
11.1997 - 04.1998 Salesman and front-desk employee
Intrawest Corporation (Ski sports)
Whistler, BC, Canada
02.1997 - 05.2001 Office and front-desk manager (part-time)
BMP Translations AG
Basel, Switzerland
Languages
German Mother tongue
English Mother tongue
French Fluency written and spoken (Level C2)
Spanish Good knowledge written and spoken (Level B1)
Italian Basic knowledge spoken (Level A2)
Serbo-Croatian Elementary knowledge (Level A1)
Computer skills
Operating systems Windows, Mac OS X
Software MS Office, LATEX, FileMaker, SPSS, Stata, Adobe CS3, MLwiN
Publications
Bornstein, N. 2007. Alliance Formation in the Pre-Parliamentary Phase in Switzerland:
Towards a Re-Configuration of the Environmental Policy Space? Under review at the
Journal of Public Policy.
Sciarini, P., N. Bornstein & B. Lanz. 2007. The determinants of voting choices on envi-
ronmental issues: A two-level analysis. In The dynamics of referendum campaigns. An
international perspective, ed. C. H. de Vreese. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Bornstein, N. & B. Lanz. 2007. Voting on the Environment: Price vs. Ideology? Under
review at Ecological Economics.
Bornstein, N. & Ph. Thalman. 2006. ‘I pay enough taxes already!’ Applying economic
voting models to environmental referendums. Under review at Social Science Quarterly.
Extracurricular activities
Extended voyages in Eastern Europe (Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,
Hungary), Latin America (Cuba, Mexico, Guatemala) and Southern Europe
Member of the EPFL Delegation at Harvard World Model United Nations 2007 in Geneva
http://worldmun.org/2007/
Profound interest in German, Swiss and French literature from Naturalism to post-WWII
References
Prof. Philippe Thalmann Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, ENAC - INTER -
REME, BP Station 16, CH-1015 Lausanne. Ph. +41 21 693 73 21, Fax +41 21 693 38
40, Email: philippe.thalmann@epfl.ch
Prof. Pascal Sciarini University of Geneva, Department of Political Science, Bd du Pont-
d’Arve 40, CH-1211 Geneva 4. Ph. +41 22 379 83 86, Fax +41 22 379 83 86, Email:
pascal.sciarini@politic.unige.ch
